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1. Chapter I., Preliminary Obserwa ti ons
.
Pragma tism a philosophy, It c la imp to "be the philosophy of the
empirical art practical, Fot opposed to thinking . r hile •/ our g as a philo so
phy
,
its ge n er a 1 outline has been. ^omrula ted, By this it c p r he Judged now
/II philosophies must answer certain questions. Pragira tism i a no exception
Pro yr.'P ti sm claims to he "only a re 1" rare for some old '"ays o r thinking,"
and is new only in the sense o-r being a ’'system, " lTow ’"hat toes this new
"system" ha we to say about religion? This is the question ,rThich this dis-
sertation seeks to ar Riser in part. Reason for the title, ,,rrhe T eligious
Aspect of Pragma tism., " is that, all philosophy touches religion in some '"i-
tal way. Two preliminary questions
,
Fhich pragma ti sm? and That religion?
The word 1 pragma ti sm. ' ha s been used + o cower 'ary things not me art by the
leaders in the mowement. '"he kir d of ’pragmatism:’ considered ir this dis-
sertation is that of Tilliam James and his associates. It- is practically
the sa> e as ' human i tar iar i sm' and 'persora lism, ’ says Tawden . Jt is built
up from what ,!, e may be s a i d to kr ow > Bpes not claim -to so lwe all mysteries
but insists that mystery be pushed as far as possible a^-ay from us. Jt in-
sists on beginning with actual experience, '"he unreal universe of "Appear-
ance and reality.
"
A Pra gmn tiara. proposes to corserw© our common sfense. Brad
ley' s classic ,rrork ar excellent preparative ^or the acceptance o ^ pragma-
tism, not by intention, but by carrying intellectual ism to absurdity. He
reduces all we know to pure seeming. Pragmatism is the answer to such ab-
3a%.~\4c 4r

surdi t»y. It is rot urfriendly to metaphysics ?? Puoh, fo r it, too, has
i ts metaphysics. It opposes tha t kind that reduces eve rything yhi it re
experience to re re sha lows or 1 appear^r ces . It insists or keeping its.
I
feet on the earth while tryinp to see o Trer the clouds, h—:ma tism is the
philosophy or motion. Its metaphysics must provide for motion. Bradley's
reality cold and receding, that of pragmatism is t^r tible ir some real
sense. / s to the question, ?’ha t religion is to be considered? it is to be
"borne in mind that among thinking people, ^11 religious belief clusters
around one of t irTo types, pantheism and theism, "by "hich t -tit.? ,pr e me^n pri-
marily the too trine that makes hod impersonal or personal. It is designed
to show the religious implications pragmatism as to these t ,p: o systems.
The outline of the discussion: Pragmatism ar ' the Absolute
,
Pragmatism ''r i
Pluralism, Pragmatism ar 1 Truth, and Pragmatism and the Ethics o° religious
Belief.
2. Chapter II., Pragmatism and the Ab solute.
The most significant thing about pragmatism a-s regards its religious
implications is its relation tq, the Absolute of J*r. Bradley. James 1 opposi-
tion to the Absolute likely to mislead the casual reader. ! Te is not oppos-
ing the t heists* rod ,rrh er opposing the Absolute, know the rearing of
the Absolute ,,rhich James opposes quotations are made from ''Appearance and
Peality, shoring that Bradley is positively ?n confessedly atheistic. is
r
Absolute is practically the god of pantheism, which me ar s atheism under ar
-
other name. Ke denies personality A o it / Quotation from a theistic writer
as to fod* s
•
personality contrasted th the impersonal Absolute. Xrr dley reduc-
es 'do d to ar "aspect.'' All wor shipful fee. irg is precluded in approaching
his Absolute, and religion is impossible. Quotations shoring the absurdity
attaching to his argument for the 'immanence o f the Absolute.' All tra.n-
.
—
1
.

scenderce- in a personal sense is, of course, ex *luied. O^er agin st this
is the teaching o^ the theistic philosopher t ho t c o:' is loth in?' oner t end
transcendent . Answer to the objection o^ the absolutist t bo t such a thing
is logically absurd: the analogy o r‘ the inwarer 1 -trar seen ler t human spir-
it. Pragmatism accepts ,rhat it kr o" r s to be a fact v let’er it ear be e > -
T)ia j net or not. r"he quibble that this is rot "’hat trarscerder talism rears
Pragmatism, therefore, is not ungodly p nd profane far a tt “Cking the /Iso-
lute, °or it must be killed before the "od of theism car live. “he irrec-
oncilalili ty o p Bra dleyar a-- solutism ?r 1 theism. ”ot the object of this
chapter to s how which is right and which '"rn r g , but to show that they are
unalterably antithetical systems. Pragmatism is a challenge to return to
the more common-sense way o° ap or caching the problem of the universe. It
proposes to attach real importance to pur ratine irs tir.cts ard unavoidable
la.bits of thinking, hoes not insist or kr o™i r g the ultimate nature of one
thing before accepting it as a fact an l using i t to approach something
else. The only religion that car. survive the doctrine of the Absolute is
pantheism, v hich is really r.o religion, but merely another raise for athe-
ism.
3. Chapter III., Pragmatism an d .Pluralism.
Pradleyan absolutism is extreme idealistic monism on the impersonal
plane. The pragmatist ioes not necessarily, r or does he generally, oppose
idealism. TTe ioes oppose this impersonal monism. I 'hat does the pragmatist
place over against the Absolute? Pluralism is +he answer. r'his has sent
a t ’crill of horror to many because they understood him to be advocating
a plurality o r 'rods. o v' the hialism o^ mind and matter i ecessarily. A. cau-
tion against- ' ecomirg confused through the use of the s p me ,,rords by differ
ent authors with different ire "rings, Bradley's Absolute is Herbert Ppsneer

*
o
'Unknowable
,
5
• an 1 oth are practically 1 the-thir T -ir --i ts If.’ fames rot
a ‘believer in polythei sm, but a 1 pluralist . ' doctor Po- re ’ispara-es "spon-
taneous plural i sm. " Jut rot the same thing is implied. both believed in the
same thirst a plurality of persora 1 centers, or 'selves.' fames' 'plural-
ism' tie same as Powne's ' persora lism' ii this serse. Powne truly a prag-
ma ti s t
,
arc’, in spirit, agreed with fames more than is disagreed. Put he was
also a theologian, a r 1 -sent farther in dogmatics . ' h?or i sm ' as a located by
Bowne Trras the monism of a personal Creator, tie original One, not the monism
0^ pan'theism. Pluralism might or might rot mean a plurality of ur created and
eternal spirits, T ip t is not vital to the discussion here
,
r or is it T’iial
in the de^rni ti on of ' pluralism. ’ fames -’as p r o’- ably r ot a 'pluralist' in
this sense, bu J that matters not, sc far as this ’iseussior i p concern ed.
Put e^er that ,t deory would ro* be as disatrous to religion as pantheistic
monism. r e are cor s ci ous of personal freedom, T” li ?h coul d rot be the case
if we were not to a certs ir extent independent creatures, '"he sense of free-
dom is among our certairties
,
if are cer^ir o " anything. If we cannot
trust this which we perceive imme ia tely
.
ho” r car. we trust what we perceive
only medi at elv? t'hile we w: influenced by our environments w© are not ab-
solute ly determined ir; cor luct by x hese outer forces. Quotation from fames,
-showing that, to his mind, there might rot be such a thing as an /ll-^no^er
who ”t any one moment is consciously thinking all knowledge, but that he
did think that the whole universe wp.p ’noetic' for some ind or for minds
as a plurality, be does not say that there may not be such an /II -Kroner
,
| however. Pony theists hav© believed t ce same thing, °nd the belief is not
without a shade o° support in Christian li te^af ’•e
,
especially the Bible.
This position seems to be rather the consistent one from the standpoint
o** the idealistic -persora list, thirker ,,Tho believes that phenomena °re the
«

functionings ?i; 1 hence the creations of some mi no or min Is , n r-d especially
if it is cor s j dered that the ipheromenal un i ver r e is the "speech" o' t ie
Creator ad Pressed to some percipient creature
,
f why shoul 1 he have "been
thus "speaking” or functioning from all eternity then there was r.o finite
mine to sr-.eak to? rhi s appears ^lso if we con si ter that the finite mind
brings something ai so ir. the wny o^ creation in 'he very a c t or • fact of
perceiving • "'he fact of time he ini; only our finite form o r> perceiving toes
not obviate the argument. Pragmatism wakes place hr the epistemological
truth that the individual mind at least assists ir creating its own uri-
verse by assir.il? ting the raw material o*' knowledge given it. Christian
theism has generally assumed that the ^ird t? creature actually assists Cod
in creating the perfect system. If this he true of the - oral order, why not
of the intellectual order a Iso ? Chri st.iani ty r >sts upon t he claim o r free
personalities hy which alone morality is possible, ^ha t some may rhu r e the
freedom '"ill not mar the consummation o f the perfect moral pl^n eventually.
nhc possibility of other universes, nr orders; the reasonableness of the
doctrine of "interacting spheres." Put this fact ought not to lead us to
ignore the universe which we can ir a measure at least perceive and know.
V'e are to study it as it is, an d not as it might have been created. This
pluralistic idea personality is refreshing
,
and gives our - oral and in-
tellectual life a validity which is utterly impossible under the system of
the Absolute. The outlook ^or an eternity of ever increasing activity and
attainment is the heaven of the pragmatists..
r> o
4. Chapter Iv
.
,
Pragma tism. d Truth.
Hare is '"here pragmp tism has Veer most severely criticised. "'he idea
t .-in t truth works "better than error . "Defiritior truth as agreement with
reality ar 1 other statements from Carnes’ '' ’"ra gmatisi . ’’ These guota ti or.s
rake clear certain teachings of the pragmatists, Ir ius ti ce has evi dently
keen lone t her. . '"hey lo claim that 'workability P r 1 efficiency ere certain
aspect? of truth. Put critics ha ,r e‘ claimed that this means ra te'rialis tic
or ir.di'wi dual: s ti c efficiency, hot true. The false chary e that rayma.ti.sts
hold efficiency as the only thing to 1 e considered, that it is pure utili-
tarianism or the selfish "basis. Efficiency is ar: aspect of truth, "but that
is not all that must "be considered. The utility includes utility of all or
ders o'" intelligent "beings
,
part 6f whom we may rot ' e able to kr ow
.
Truth is not something trarscerdert but concrete "or some intelligence. It
also opposes "the fallacy o'" the universal,'' which is a theory of tran-
scendence. Truth is either kro^n or ki 0 " rable
,
verified or verifiable. Ac-
tion is inseparable from truth, p to kno vT the truth is to rake a. differ-
ence, to make a difference is to ,r7ork, and certairly the -working must be
for good, else truth would be less efficient than error. Fot claimed that
this bare prir ciple is a cure-all for mystery. F-ome times ws cannot as yet
apply the test. Put as our horizon ,r'idens we car: apply the test i t h ever
increasing potency. "he higher we climb the better can see. As yet we
see only imperfectly. r e carrot kroy positively what "if "erer ce certain
beliefs may make ir: the future. Put we apply the test in the largest pos-
sible sense to prove the worth of this or that religion. There are differ-
ences o n opinion as to what is best: who shall arbitrate? Pa tur ally J hose
•-hose opportunities are presumed to be the test for giving a -"ide survey
of the results to individuals and to society. This must evi Partly be the
Q'
I
Christian r.a tions
,
•por they 'r^-e t he : Balances or 1 a rts . "be : eas of
•orkirg ' :?sil morally charge f'roM the lower to t he higher stei r rds as
the vis lor breeders. But the rix-pl test of efficiency cannot be in this
life or ii this world. It presupposes some wider vision either for us or
for somebody, /s we <'ird certain ideas efficier. t vr e call fieri true, hen
they fool us or - mislead us we coil them false, "ruth, then, is '.hot prop-
er ty of our ideas which make food their promise, fcience assumes that true
ideas are more efficient thar. false ores. Quotations from Boutroux to show
that James has been correctly interpreted: idea i f - o prediction whose
truth is its p^e dieting correctly, that is, the bringing us into closer
20 n tact ’"i th the reality about which the prediction is made. It is the lead-
ing in the idea which takes us +oward the reality. r’h?refo re
,
it is proper
to note clearly that pragma. tism does rot ignore the objective reality, as
has been charged, but declares that the truth o ** ar idea, by bringing us
into rig 'it relations with reality, is at one and the same time giving us
efficiency. Hence ’workability is not the only aspect Of t^uth, for it
does not consider truth fron all sides. rrruth is, as we have just seen,
that property o * th' idea which derives its '-orkabjli ty from the fact that
\
at one and the s ame t ime it takes correct accour t of the ob.i e dive reality .
This answers implicitly at least the question, Is an idea true because it
works, or toes it work because it is true? "rut h presents two aspects, as
we have just seen. Solipsism is no necessary part of pragmati sm. Pragmatism
would insist at, t lie juncture upon the distinction between p a e
t
as object-
ive reality and truth whi eh is only that property of ar idea ,r*hi ch predicts
correctly about fiat fact. Hence *«•© car say that "-hi la the fa ct irr y remain
the same, we cor s ti tu te the true idea by correctly idea -ting, "ragmafism
also does rot confine truth to the verified
,
but applies ii to the ’rer if i-
a.ble . Our ideas may be lea ding correctly toward the reality .predicted of,

gel y =ug j e c t i ye.
c
'Ome mind. Ilealism
but we may ball by the ”-py-side before ™e actually reach the reality.
* l
PragnF tiSK r sees sari ly t"kes rote of the epis tenolo T ica j. cl si cr t ir our
thinking a r > knowing, the "not teat. we help to make the thing as we think
it, nr. d hence in n sense we help to make the truth, '"or the "ull truth o.
a thing carrot ex is t before the thing itsel" exists.
’ r
o
creatures contribute towr ! the universe which we individually have 'or out
thought
,
we xi r o ' say
,
but it is cot s i clem’ le
,
“’or ro t”'o see the so ire.
thing exactly the same way, an a. proof is a creature
ITo " thing-in-itself . " All reality real cr ly ir ar t for
teaches that- pher onsr.a are intellectual functionings by a mir • 'r o a
mind or for a mind, ^he phenomenal or ter is thus a cor start action, and
since it is charging, the truths ""'out 1 + must be charging . ull ere it is
given the objective f» o tor
,
' wha te^er that may be, i r i t be only certain
stimuli according to certain laws. Put the the:' the is tic persorelists can
feel t’-m t they are really h lping the Creator to : /~k c
.
the universe. 1 aei r
work
,
then, is essential, r.ot mere seeming p r • child’s play, ’r a grr.a t i s t s do
not deny that, there ore c a r tain complete'1 truths j it der ies r corq iete "'ruth.
Truth, then, hr t be pragma ti st r res or t s two aspects; usefulness arc! cor-
re i tress . It has
,
therefore
,
a gr ea t deal t o say jr fP
r
or of t rose t sp t
basal ideas which express the deepest ’errands our nature, "hi s oug itr.esg
of things is a philosophical proof the reality o " that ,rr'iich ought to
be. "his is, in substance, tie same phi losophi cal ny gurert o r Tfar t ir his »
"bract! cal reason," an 1 is the "categorical imp-era ti ,re , " "ran ,r hi ch he de-
duced his greatest argument for' the existence o-s a r'or a 1 1 . Pragmatism
the first system 0 * philosophy to base its life or + he proposition that truth
is always a valuable tool, a useful thing, more useful than error. v hat
works beat is truest, ar d wh?:t is truest works best, ar ' the trut h of 'the
£
ilea, be it remembered, is fiat property the i 'ea T"hich yrehic ts cor-
rectly cor.oe'y ing the reality.
5 . Cha p t er v . , Pr a gma t i s: ar t he thies o r r el i g i or:
.
The great », ^iue o * the pragmatic method ar ’ philosophy lies ,*’ust
here . necessarily ir. rlose sympathy ,r*i th the native instincts ai ’ ur a -
voidable habits of thought and also those great yd irre; ressitle longings
ai:d beliefs, of these j leas that of the the! s tic Cod is certairly r.u:h more
natural art 3ommo r t iar th^*1 of t he- par the is tic .Absolute. ~o 1 is all ’ ut 3
uniter sal i lea. rhe reli •-ior o ~ the absolutists is esser t ialiy selfish 3rd
la *?y . Here are the • so-called Chris t iar; scientists
,
or American par 4 heists,
’"ho se attitude toward certain public phi Iar thropi es is well known. ley
’iiee t humar misery by ignoring it. Jf it i a sought to measure the "orkings
of such a system by a lor’ period of time the test is Irtia. Jt ha" rot
brought as. much joy as has theism, ''or i + is oppose'’ to go o' feelirgs as
well as to bad or.es. Its ^oal is a state o:r eterral araes thesis
,
so to
soeak; oblivion, ar.rihila ti or ir the Absolute, "he contrast is the ci ,Tii-
H
• •
izatior o^ the r ’est
,
the results of pluralistic ar theistic j’lilosophy.
It is. the or ly ci^iliza tior -tha t has achieved, is active, and phi lar thropi c
.
It maintains that the highs st ’lies is to be attained through activity.
i
The only belief that has reformed the dowr-ar. d-cuts is the religion of a.
Person, tee theistic faith. Jt alone has transformed stages ir to civilized
‘’oiks. Thy? because the doctrine of pantheistic absolutism denies that there
is any ] ^obl em to be solved, ary work to be fore, '"here i« ro real dis-
tirction 1 e tween good ar d e,ril so far as real morality is corcerned. fin
is a fiction, Ilerc e the whole moral problem is reduced to a roner. tity.
l
The history o^ the contrasting systems. Ho tior is real ir. the sense that
phenomena are real, and the only solution of the problem: o^ mot: on seems

to be or) t ie personal plane. Put the true philosophy must provi te for the
veracity of our actions, '"he philosophy o r the day i r - that of action as a
fact, either explicit or implicit . If action carrot he provided for under
the old idea o° stuff-rotter, then that hypothesis* rust go, ar ' idealism
must take its pla ce. Put moti or
,
meanwhile
,
re- -’ins ar. d rust remain ir. ~uch
a ser.se as to gi^e •,rirtue a place -in li^e. Fo-
,
”’ha t has pro gr a t isrr: to say
concerning the idea of a persoral r-od? V'illiam James' cor. fessed faith ir
persor.aJL experience as the prim ry proof of r, od's existence. Yet this -roof
is of no ,ralue ^rom the absolutist's tr an seen ler.ta.i shml- oirit. 'he argu-
ment of John Piske as proving
. the existence of rod from evolution is the
pragmatic method. Fart’s ''categorical imperative," his favorite proof of
the exi ter oe o^ '"-od, is, as we have noted, the pragmatic method applied to
life and its needs. Fiat has. pragmatism to say concerning the idea of per-
sonal immortality? It rust logically support it, °or life's richest ard
completes t condition car' he realised only through acting as if this were
true. Justic cannot possibly exist unless, pe^sor al immortality is a fact,
for if this li^c he all, ir justice reigns. Put s i r e e re are sure of partial
justice here, "a power not ourselves that makes for righteousness , " we are
assured that perfect- justice is at the throne the universe, and hence
personal immortality is the ire^j table assurance. Put. the value of the idea
as to the reality about- —hi oh it predicts is seen by approaching it from
\
another standpoint. It is admitted that the idea is ir. dispensable for the
highest and richest life o r the individual even here art for the protection
society from absolute anarchy. Shall we say that an idea esser t la I to -
the ir i^idur! ard the race is at the same time esser tially ^lse? That is
to say that, here falsehood works better than truth, —hi eh is a r ever sal of
the bed-rock tenet of both science ar t pragra tdsm. The value of the uriver-
s."l nope of immor ta li ty from the pragmatic star, "'point is a guarantee of the
r eal i ty
.

Chapter I.
Prelimirary Observations
Pragmatism is a philosophy. Its key-idea is the practice! aspect
of thought. It purports to he the determination a ri application of phi-
losophy to concrete interests. Consequently, it does rot, as is quite
popularly supposed, ra ke against philosophy or such, for it is it-
self a philosophy. But it 'Clai s that true philosophy is practical, rot.
iridescent j helpful, rot harmful} that' it cores to bless, rot to curse,
those percipient ar:d reflective beings whose business it is, be they hu-
man or superhuman, finite or ii °irite. It claims truly that all philos-
ophy which is or is .ever to be ary concern o '0 ours by coring ,rri thir: our
short horizon must necessarily touch us somehow, sometime, somwhere, and
influence us either for weal or for ’^oe. Pragmatism boldly affirms that
that philosophy which touches us to hinder ra t’B r than to help, to in crese
our burdens rat er than to lift them, is by that very f^ct proved to be
false. But pragmatism is a philosophy nevertheless, and that fact is the
thing ,rr e wish to fix in the mind at the outset.
ITor is pragmatism opposed to thinking in a systematic ar d compre-
hensive fashion. It is neither a creedless philosophy ror a lazy man’s
metaphysics, as has frequently been insinuated by its opponents. On the
contrary, it is seekirg to enlarge itself into a ’’system*'. It has its de-
tails only partially worked out, o r course, being comparatively young as
a philosophy. However, it has enunciated some very positive tenets *"hich
indicate what its metaphysics must conserve when fully worked out. Jr other
words, its metaphysical skeleton is now to be seer in the museum of philo-

sophical exhibits, not, however, as ?o many dry bones pore extinct
dinosaur ot* primeval thinking, from ^Mch the li ring tissue has long
since rotted off, hut rather as the living T ores of a healthy young em-
bryo upon - Thi ch the tenderer tissues are expected to grow ir due time.
v
.As to its exact appearance after these tissues are grown ,r'e cannot say,
hut having before us the skeleton outline, we are assured t : iat it must
appear approximately as the frame -work o r the system determines. The fault
of the system, if it is to possess ^ault
,
must therefore he primarily with
the .frame
-
,vork and not with that which the "frame -work supports, hence we
are fully justified in examining this skeleton without waiting till the
muscles and tendons are added.
As we said in the outset, pragmatism is a philosophy. Coming to us
as something relatively new in the sense that it is a , s t er. of thinking,
there are certain questions which it must confront at the very outset of
its career, and before which it must pass muster if it is to wi'n and hold
a place in subsequent thought. It. must be able to give a sound reason for
•t
the hope that is within it. Every philosophy must run this gauntlet, and
pragmatism can form no exception to this universal rule. Tut pragmatism
neither expects nor desires such exemption. Tf it is to stand it must
stand upon its merits. It. has courted contest, and has certainly had its
full share. Pragmatism, so say its enemies, has come ^orth an ur.circum-
cised Colia.th to openly defy the hosts of Israel, °nd it yet remains to be
seen whether or not the old philosophical camp can discover sore oppor-
tune David mighty enough to bring back its head.
It is proper to observe in this connection that the founders of the
pragmatic system have never claimed to be offering something "new under
the sun." In the title which Processor James chose br his epoch-making

"book he bol dly calls pragmatism only "a re ” 7 name for some old ways of
thinking.” Then I referred to It ir f'B preceding paragraph as a new
system, I laid emphasis upon the Tr, nrd system . p or it is or ly as a system
of thought that it claims to he new. Later on we expect to rote this fact
more at length, and show that this whole movement is largely one of artic-
ulation, the bringing together under a new name and into one school of many
great, chapters 0 * thought hitherto seemingly Isolated.
V'e ha ,T e just said that pragmatism must answer eerla in questions. • Of
all the questions which, any new philosophy must expect to have asked, none
is more certain or mor 3 de risi^e than t his : That do you propose to do with
religion? That, must be the result to religion if your philosophy be true?
This question is inevitable, 'or religion and philosophy can nomore be sep-
arated than religion an d life, religion is not something related to life;
it is & -.vital part of life. Likewise philosophy is not something t hat has,
or may have
t
some relation to religion; religion is inherent in any philos-
ophy; it is a constituent element in philosophy. Low
,
as we s-mr in the out-
set, pragmatism is a philosophy. This being the case, it is ir correct to
speak of the relation of pragmatism to religion, or of religion to pragma-
tism, as has been done by certain eminent writers on both sides. Conse-
quently instead 0^ adopting the title, "The relation of Pragmatism to
religion," lor this dissertation, I ha ve worded it, "The Peli-~ious Aspect
o
* Pragmatism." It is our aim, therefore, to consider a t some length the
religious implications and possibilities of this recent system.
fuch a discussion must necessarily deal with two questions as prelimi-
naries of the real questions to follow. These preliminary questions are:
Thich pragmatism is to be examined? and Thich religion is to be bad in mind?
Per no one can real the writings of those who call themselves pragmatists
very extensively without being compelled to admit that there are pragmatists

an 1 pragma f i s ts . -Apparently Professor James died without discovering that
any pragmatist differed from him regard! ng t 1; »’•! t**! question ir the system.
Put hat he lived a little longer we carrot Put
,
b jlie^e that he would ha^e
seen that, as with, every other system o^ teaching so here also, there are
«
” rol^es masquerading ir sheep's clothing. rhis in frankly stated ir. that
admirably written "book, "The Principles o r Pragma ti sm , " by IT. H. Pawden.
On page vii o'' the Preface he say?: "'"her a ha^o arisen, however, many ap-
parently contradictory inter relations o^ this new movement, even in the
minds its professed exponents.” r'ithout attempting to classify the vari-
ous writers as belonging to either the extreme right, the extreme ie^t, or
the center, I will syy that the pragmatism ,rrhich I shall discuss is that of
Professor James and of those ,rTho share "hth him ir their vi e ,r’p of the main
points
.
Inasmuch, therefore, as the term pragmatism has be ^n forced to do
service of a. contradictory kind and +o steak a various language, we felt
tha t it ,rras necessary to define the serse in which we propose to use it.
Having limited it to that o** Professor James ard his school, we shall here
add merely a few words to make clear what he means by the term.
~
re tells us
that it is practically the same as human i tariar ism. At any r^te
,
tint is
substantially "’hat it is in that it proposes to approach the problem of
philosophy from the standpoint of humanity. It insists that for us philos-
ophy should be in vital touch with our actual life as it is and may become
in the largest sense. Hence, it proposes to begir ’"ith those things \T,hich
are most surely known (if we know anything), v1 build f r or hums r i ty ard
human experience .as the foundation. Instead of starting with the transcend-
ental it proposes to start, with the empirical. It "oes rot claim, to solve
»
all mysteries, but it insists tha t the mysteries unsolved shall be pushed
as far as possible away from our human center to our human circumference.

It recognizes t-’is.t there is a horizon to nil hums n knowledge
,
a r.d that its
sky is not cloudless. But it stoutly insists that the .proper place for rec-
ognizing mystery is "beyond the horizon and "behind the clouds. v'hy , it asks,
should we pass out of experience and enter a re^lir o^ pure abstraction and
erhaps i agination, a r d there "build up such a theory of reality as to re-
duce everything that we think Vrre know to mere illusion? Pragma ti sin insists
i
that we should sweep "before our onTn door-step "before going abroad into the
realm o r pure fiction and trying to cle^r up before the door-step o r the
Absolute. It, too, believes most heartily in preaching repentance for the
sin of inconsistent thinking, but it proposes to begin at Jerusalem; Prag-
matism attaches real importance to our experiences, ar 1 proposes jto hold to
them and conserve them throughout, an d wherever i + becomes necessary to
noli to the validity of experience or to cleave to o iry speculation, ITaomi-
like, it will part company with the latter. It may be regarded as the meta-
physics of -empiricism, but ,,rith the emphasis pl^pys on empiricism' rather
tha n on me taphys i c s
.
And certainly anyone ,rr ho is in lo^e with red-blooded life, ,rrho is
disposed to take it at anything like its fnce-vr>lue
,
to regard its data
and experiences as anything more than mere seeming °rd dreaming and its
r a t i v e impulses *rd desires as anything beyond vsarlrgleds joking and
mocking, will lay down a book like Bradley’s "/ppearance and reality" wi th
a feeling t hat if that sort of thing be true philosophy then certainly phi-
losophy is none of our mortal business, and that this is a clear instance
"where ignorance is bliss" and, "*tis ^olly to be wise." 7or to us who per-
sis. t in 'thinking that our selves are rea 1 real: ti es and not mere n T -o — r ops t
who feel that when we love ''oiks we are loving something more than other
mere appearances, who cannot look at hi the rush of exultation on the
f f
'
.
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ore hard, or gaze upon all the plodding weariness ard listen to t e far
call of sufferihgvon t tie other, ard feel th°t it, too, is only the cachina-
tion or delirium of a craay and earirgless universe ~o up, I say, there
is a feeling not merely o^ apathy tut o f antipathy and digust at such a re-
ductio ad absurdum of practically everything that gives life ary charm and
richness o^ meaning whatsoever, Por, as ,,? e shall see, Pre.diey nol only an-
nihilates man as anything more than a wp iking shadow, hut ,r_ith another fell
swoop more hold and spectacular still dethrones -od as a personal 'ting,
an \ then demolishes the very throne itself. I carrot Conceive ho**’ anything
could be conjured up which would be farther from actual life, so ~ar as we
know life, nothing that could possibly be executed in. the ,rr?y of literary
labor that would be more antagonistic to the deepest interests humanity,
than such a system o* metaphysics as therein set forth, provided only that
it were possible to get mankind at lar**e to believe it *r,i t h all its impli-
cations. Goodness is a myth, and virtue a necessary distemper; freedom of
the will is a mockery, and moral responsibility a nightmare; finite knowl-
edge is a chimera, and there is no appeal to reason, for the very faculties
themselves have been adjudged the most, consummate of all prevaricators, to
be believed under no circumstances whatsoever (savg -’hen they corroborate
/
•the contention of the learned author, in which case they must not only be
believed in what they actually say but in what they ray even remotely in-
timate) . In short, .the whole universe as ,rs know it is a rudderless bark
adrift upon a shoreless sea, with ro master at its heaim and no haven at
its prow. ' ret Ir. Pradley may be sai d to have r er dered a v-i Up' le service
by demonstrating that philosophy o r the ultra-trarscer den tal type leads to
absurdity, an d hence 'tp s somehow and somewhere lost its way. One might be-
li eve t'la.t he ra d this ^sry thing as his object if ’hhc weight of his writ-
ing as a whole ’id not make it necessary to take him seriously.

• I
In fact, did not K^nt inter tior.ally do substantially what Bradley
nap done unintentionally? I refer to ’’The Critique o? Pure Pea nor:
,
” in
which, as Trre all know, Kart showed how the simple reason alone could not
lea l us into all truth, that, urai ded, it car lead only to scepticism.
He showed how there are other demands of our nature than those of pure
ratiocination, a.rd that these demands are just as imperative in their
sphere as ape the demands of pure reason, and just as reliable. This
latter proposition was more particularly set forth in his ’’Critique of
Practical Peason,” to which we shall refer later or.
But whereas Kant avowed the insufficiency of pure reason and. proved
it from the standpoint of one who did not make reason king of destiny,
Bradley in his undivided adoration f or in tellectualism pure and simple
leads his readers to the same conclusion as that which must follow the
reading of Kant's work. V’e may say that Kant showed the inevitable scep-
ticism of pure ratiocination from the standpoint of an enemy; Bradley,
fvom the standpoint o f a friend, therefore, it can be truly said that
the latter's work is more powerful than, that of the former, because it
comes after the best attempt ev^r made to prove the all-sufficiency and
the absolute despotism of the unaided human reason. Fondling convinces
so much as the break-down in the argument of the coursel.
V

A It hour:h this effect ,,r?p rot inter led or Ms \ art , h-> has succeeded
a dmi rably ir the case o many of us, d I do rot kro’ rr ary other cook whi ch
is so well calculated to prepare the way "'or the triumphant coring pf prag-
matism. for myself J car say that T laid it a aide "h th. ? feeling that I
vranted to say a few thirds out of my ^ery heart o ^ hearts j r fro test a~airst
'7hat seemed to me a system of ”*e taphysica 1 free! ooting . I am confident that
such bald art cold conclusions as therein cor taired
,
corclusiors evidently
held by many other like-mirded mer
,
ha v 3 dore more to prepare the way for
a recall of such intellectual judges through the initiative and referendum
of pragmatism than any other agency. Pragmatism is a reactionary movement
against transcer den talism gone to seed. Jt is a summons to return to the
first love, the sane confidence ir the essential veracity of all our fac-
ulties working in a vrell balanced unison, and to recast our whole system
of. thinking
,
sc far as it needs to be recast, in the moulds o r' common sense.
/ s we paid before, so here we repeat, that pragmatism is not* unfriendly
to metaphysics, but it has seen enough to kr 0" t that e^en metaphysics must
perish if t he conclusions o r the extreme trar scerder talists are accepted,
for the conclusion o^ the whol-e matter, as T understand it, of the Pradleyan
school is this, when briefly stated: The only thing ’' re oar positively know
is that we do not know anything, and we are rot quite sure of that. All the
aetaphysics that can survive such a criticism as his is purely a nonentity,
an absolute negation o p all reliable thinking so far as --’c finite beings are
concerned. All reality is set above the grasp our limited faculties com-
pletely and rust forever mock us with its unapproachable -lory. Positive
knowledge of any dimension is as completely insulate- 1 from our i oor souls
as is the Unknowable o p Herbert fpencer.
In contrast to this cold and distant mysticism, pragma ti sm
,
as we said
in the outset, believes that true philosophy i c - primarily practical, and
f'
that it mus t <ttow out of tangible experiences arh 'rit ii to concrete life.
V'hile it strive? r> s hard as pry other system to -at it? head above the
clouds
,
it
:
roposes at the tire to stared " '1 a t -.f o o t e d upon the earth.
/II true thinking must s omehow touch reel life as core clou ply lived ?oire-
where and by some person. It must not sneer at and. mock as unreal all the
experiences w hi oh r e instinctively hold as o p real -r orth. Pragi: a ' isk con-
tends for a. philosophy that "•ill stimulate activity. It is the philosophy
of the strenuous life, /s such it boldly confronts the ultra-transcendental
philosophy which is the philosophy o ^ the quetist ar 1 the recluse.
Being the philosophy o r the irterse life, me need rot be surprised to
find that pragmatism holds to the doctrine of motion. But this does rot nec-
essarily mean raotior ii the old stuff-me iter serse. Pragmatists ger. ©rally,
if not universally, incline strongly to the few t reory the universe as
dynamic. rhus it is strictly in harmony as a philosophy with, the quite mod-
ern theory of the evolution of t he universe through a long j recess of devel-
opment and unfolding. Bust now the world is hearing this doctrine of the
essential motion of all reality vigorously expounded by Bergson. It goes
without saying, therefore, that pragmatism n ir.ds ro place for such a theory
of dead ar d- static matter as made the her a oli tic flow philosophically unten-
able, neither can it permit the death-like rigidity of the Elea tics. Yet
pragmatism, as we have already noted, is the a jostle o^ motion, but of mo-
tion which is consistent with the dynamic nature o n the universe. It agrees
with those who, like Pe c t or Bo ,rTne, assert that being is a c t i r. g in some sense
ipf activity, 'his is clearly set
by H. K. Eawden, above referred to. Or psge 50 he says, 'Teslity is experi-
ence." He makes it clear that he does not mean purely "’hat. is experienced
or capable of being experienced by finite beings, but by ? or a sort lent be: ng.
n$
y• •
emphasizes the content of experi er.ce. ExperienceHe s ays further: 'Ter* lit
emphasizes the process of reality."
It thus he cones apparent at a glance that at this very point there is
a radical difference betweer the pragmatists and the old-school absolutists
of the Bra dieyen type, /s the reader of Bradley’s ".Appearance and reality"
will recall, reality is therein set forth as something rot to be confounded
with finite things. They are always and only mere appearances. Feality thus
runs not with the common herd. It is always something transcendent, some-
thing beyond experience, for to him finite experience is only some sort of
delusion, not actually touching reality at all, dealing only ”'i th appearance
The second preliminary question which we stated it would be necessary
for us to consider before proceeding to the main thesis is, YKia.t particular
type of religion must we ha ^e in mind a e ^0 consider the religious aspect
of pragma tisrn? All that is necessary 'in answer to this question is to point
out that the word religion is often used in two antithetical senses. I re-
fer to pantheistic, or impersonal, systems of thought on. the one hand, and
to personalis ti c systems on the other, including in this latter class the
theistic philosophy which may be said to have practically displaced among
thinking people both the polytheism o r primitive races and the old deism
of the Bonn Stuart Kill type. So that the question is substantially a ques-
tion of par theism versus theism.
Y’e shall see as we proceed that pragmatism is decidedly opposed to
the former and consistent with the latter type of religion. By saying this
I lo not affirm nor even imply that all pragma tist s are actually theists
in their belief, but what I .io affirm is that, i f consistent to the end,
they most certainly cannot be pantheists, but, or the other herd, they
can consistently, and as I see it, they must logically hold to theism.
_
I*
Pith this i-relinirpry survey, we shall proceed to ’is cuss the
religious aspect of pragma tism in the following chapters ur. der these
heads: T'ra 'ms tism ar 1 t he /"bsolute
,
Pragma tism ar.d Pluralism, Pragmati
and 'T’ruth, ard Pragmatism ard the Ethics of r eli "i our- Pelief
.
<%
Chapter IT.
r,rp + j_ STr: Pr 3 w '.c? / 1 s o I u t e
ious aspect of pragme.tisr is it? attitude toward vrha t ! r . Fradley -r:d his
the doctrine of the Absolute’ pp it ir fourd so elaborately set forth in that
ing or ly the fo rrrer hook, ore -is likely to fore a. ’wrong opinion as to what
he. is denouncing. I frankly admit that it ^as so in my own case before I
had re-read this treatise, ard more particularly before I hr d read the sec-
ond hook named. I ry first impressior ’r,as that he ,r,as discounting the Chris-
tian conception o^ Cod. Terms ar e o^ten confusing. The word /’.solute has
often been used with the ordinary theistic content. I therefore supposed
that when Professor James declared himself as pragma ti cally opposed to the
doctrine of the Absolute a.r d in sjonpathy with pluralism he "'as , ir short,
a polytheist. And T "‘erture to say that the gereral reader ’ r’ho has not
studied him more carefully is of the same op irk on
.
the Col theism, but defending the only position ,,rh.ich leases ar.y room
for such a Feing as Christians ha^e always been accustomed to call r'Od.
By studying his writings as a whole and at l^r^th, I ha^e been '“creed to
No ,rr
,
the fact, is, nothing is farther from the truth. Jr. "The Fearing
f Truth" he plainly says that by denying the Absolute he is not denying
6 <%
accede to his proposition, ?r i I frankly confess that T ho v? been com-
pletely concerted to his position in trie matter. ^hi s cor-versior or. my
part is due mainly to a careful study of "Professor J> ire s’ writings or the
one herd and of "The Appearance ar.d Feality" or the other. Jr order to
.justify my charge of mird ir the matter, J shall rom procee’ to go direct-
/
ly to head-qua rter s 'dr my reasons.,,, and cite a few of the numerous extracts
from t is elaborate treatise "by T'r. Era "ley. J do this that the book may
make clear for itself .just what he means by the /bsolute.
The following extracts are selected somewhat hurriedly, because his
definition o r the /bsolute is written so lar :re or its pa -es tea t "he who
runs may read." The "ords ,rrhich I ’"ish to emphasize particularly are un-
derscored, the emphasis being my own.
"Hence the /.bsolute is, so far, an individual and. a sys t err . " p. 144.
"Our conclusion, so far, ’"ill be this, that the Absolute is ore
system . m. ’ that its cor tents are rot hi r: g "• u. t s er ti er t ex. er i er. os . " p. 14 r f
"For we have seer, that the /bsolute must be a harmonious s y°t er:. .
"
p. 196.
From the-se statements we perceive that Hr. Eradley's Absolute is
a s ys ter; , and while in ore place he calls it ar "individual" it is an
ir jyj dual s. /stem
. the one all- comp re her. s j universal, that? r^e I
misunderstood him? Is his Absolute taking or a suspicious pantheistic
aspect? Fell, ir order to be certain our ground let us hear him still
farther : -
" vhe /bsolute is presert in, and, in a sense, it is_ alike each of its
special appearances; though present everywhere in different values ar.d
degrees." p. 467.
"H.y self is certainly rot the Absolute, but, ,rh t hout it
,
x he /bsolute
•"•Quid not be itsel f.
" p . 260.
€
"The Absolute In. each appearance , ar 1 is all, lut it is rot any ore
a S sue h* * * * * *Eve ry attitude of experience, every :n •: v ' or lo ~,~?1 o r tie
world, is a necessary factor ir the Absolute *******Ah d thus the Absolute
is immanent alike t hrough every regior o r appearance.
" p. 486.
"hut we car hardly si© 0 'P the Absolute as either ugly or evil. Tie
Absolute is. irdeed evil ir a serse a r rl it is irly art false . but the serse
ir which these predica tes car be applied, is too forced ard urr:a tural.
"
p. 486
.
"You may affirm that the Absolute ha s u ^1 j r ess ar \ error ard e 7r i 1 ,
since it owns the provinces ir ^hi c h these features are parti al elements,
hut to assert that it is ore o^ j ts own fragmentary ard deperdert let ails
would be ir.a dmis sible . " p. 4S£f,
"Ard again TToll ti or , i r "dll ad out. , becomes our Absolute." r . 182.
"But is this to deny di ver se cor ter ts ir the Absolute?" \ . 204.
(The context shows clearly that the relative answer is expected)
Purely these additional extracts car leave no possible doubt in the
mind the reader that this Absolute, at whose fe
(
et so ma.ry jious souls
have so reverently bowed down a r: d worshiped, is Quite another thing from
the personal hod or theistic faith. It "’ould seem, therefore, that nothing
more would be necessary in order to make clear I'r . Fradiey’s emphatic re-
jection of ary possibility o^ conciliation between his Absolute and a per-
sonal Being to whom we might apply John Fiske’s term of a ’quasi -human
f-od. 1 But whatever we may think of Kr . Bradley’s philosophy, we must
admit, that he is frank and honest, ar^. he has gone farther, much farther,
than the preceding s+atemerts might imply. TTe is determined that we shall
not mistake his definition of the Absolute as compared with the idea or-
dinarily denoted by 1 he ’tt cl r-od. 2o he adds:-

• •
"If •’Du identify the Absolute m i th r od, 1
'
••
•' i s r o
1 V .
"
n r r?»
1,1 ”i or; . If again you separate them, ^ol he core a a. ^ii it? factor in the
Thole (I cannot refrain from su^es ting .jokingly that he might have spelled
this last TT*ord without the 'W* ) ****ITer.ce, short the Absolute, ~od can
rot rest, ar 1 having reached that goal, is_ lost an - g el p - i on . "h 4 ’i him.
"
p. 447.
"Te may say that r-od is not r-od till he has "become all j r: all , and
that a hod, which is all in all i_s_ r o t t he r o d of religion, , hod is but an
aspect
. and that must mean an
-r-r e?T 9 r re . o " the Absolute." p. 446.
There can be no possible mistaking this Absolute. Tany similar quo-
tations might be added, but these Tr ill suffice to rake clear once for all
that hr. Bradley ’ s Absolute not only is not the t heist ic arc Christian
hod, but that the two cannot possibly coexist. Here plainly is a case where
,p,e cannot serve two masters. T’e must either hate the one, and love the other
or else we will hold to one, ar V despise the other.
n o
r# i
m
One tiling is apparent from the foregoing, ^rd the! is that the At so-
lute as thus defined and accepted is practi ceily synonymous n; ith the god
of the pantheists. In fact, it is just that thing precisely
,
not a whit
more, not a whit less, ""he Absolute is composed o^ everything that exists,
and everything t^iat exists is an element, or factor, in the composition of
the Absolute. Without jarring the rrwp of the pantheist in the least me
can write the word Ood where Frail ey writes the word .Absolute
,
er.d’the
pantheist will subscribe to the creed without a quibble. It is 'wrely pos-
sible tha.t some sophist might attempt to point out a di stir cti on between
the two, but it "din he a distinction without a -i^rerence. As we hare
just said, it is clear from ’the citations that i -0 fhis Absolute be thought
of as a god at ail, it must be a, composite god, since everything of what-
ever nature or kind,, "which was ar d is ard is to come," is a part o^ him,
or more properly, a part o*' it . .for J'r. Bradley err ha tically denies per-
sonality to this Absolute in any commonly accepted sense o^ the term., and
personality as he defines it and applies it to this conglomerate deity is
a bold step toward the creation o r an entirely new language so far as the
meaning of words is concerned. It is r urely an af ter t to put new wine
into old wine-skins. Or page 531 of "/ppearance and Feality" he says: "If.
the term ’persoral 1 is t o bear anything like its ordinary sense, assuredly
the Absolute is not merely personal." Of course, we all believe that God
is not "merely personal" in our finite sense; that is
,
we 1 o not believe
that his personal! ty is subject to our limitations. r'e do not say, and we
t
\
do not- believe, that, his nature is exhausted necessarily even in the per-
fection o^ all that * r’e think of as constituting personality; namely, in-
tellect, sensibility, ar d will. TTe may possess capacities in excess of
these three even in their perfected state, ,T,hich would Trr i thin itself be
a vast advance beyond us. Put the trouble with J'r. Bradley’s /"solute is
r o
< •
'
that it is not allowed to hipwe personality that means even as much as this
three-fold character would imply, for when he says that the /bsolute is
i ot "merely personal" if the term is to rear " o.r; '. r thin ft like, its or dir ary
sense," he may be said to deny cfempletely such a thing as we always mean
when we use the word, and what all worshipers of the theistic ^od think
of when they a. t tempt to commune with. their bei ty
.
s
To make this hot e^er more apparent
,
let us place ir contrast to
these statements about the /bsolute quoted above, the definition of ^od
as conceited o' in our ordinary Chris ti an thinking, and recently hrru-
la ted by a professor in ore our theological schools: "^od is an eter-
nal personal being, of absolute knowledge, po ,r'cr
,
and goodness." *
By common consent among Christian theologiars, cod possesses personal-
ity in a sense such as. is or ii r a rily understood
;
that is, he 3 oes not
possess less than the power to know, to feel, and to will. It is person-
ality in this sense of the term that makes worship possible, for we can
never truly reference a mere machine, ho ,,re ,rer marvelous its construction
or efficient its operations. There must be inherent in ail true worship
a feeling more or less apparent to the worshiper that the mo d he prays to
can somehow be "touched by the feeling of our infirmity," w.i ir some way
influenced to act di fferer tly from what he would act wore he not worshiped.
Co in' order to appreciate the possible religious attitude of the prag-
matist it is important first to know that t he Bra dievan absolutism which he
\
avowedly opposes is totally ard unalterably opposed to Christian theism to
its very core. Tor he not only denies person ali ty to his Absolute, as we
ha v 3 just pointed out, but he ^oes farther, ard positively rejects the Cod
of religion as being anything more than a mere appearance of reality. Te
recall that he says in one o^ the quotations ^Iven
,
"
ccd is but an ° s e c t .
*
"Cys t ema. tic The ology" by J ohr Ki ley
,
V0 1 . I
,
p . 60.
<s
r
and that must mear ft appearance, o^ the /-’’solute." For- ir r 11 car dor
,
vr'np t must be the Attitude of the theistic worshiper toward that theory
whi eh proposes to reduce his personal f-od to b mere ’’aspect”, or "app ear-
ful ance"?
/s we have before observed, 1 he worshipful- feeling on never be awak-
ened in our breasts by a mere machine when known or truly believed to be
such. The starry heavens which irsj ired such a ,r-e and such devout feelings
in trie heart of the prince of German philosophers, art! which long before
led the Hebrew poet to e v claim ,r'i th a burst of worshipful wonder, ,,rrhe heav-
ens leclare the ’•lory of hod, art the firmament showeth his ha r tiwork
,
” have
never excited awe and reverence where ail serse of personality as we know it
is removed from the thought of their origin and nature. If there be such a
thing as a true worshirer ^ho claims to be a part heist (™e have r ever heard
of one), he is such because lurking somewhere ir the chambers his deep-
est. being is an unconscious Reeling that there is at least enough common
personality between himself and the object of his worship to erable them in
some way to meet on personal grounds. Femove personality fror the universe,
and it becomes a pure machine, for there car be no middle ground, and if
there were, such a de-persoralized thing, "hile it might be greater than a
- — 'T
mere mechanism, would certainly be less than n person, and no one but an
idiot can consciously worship what is kro ,rrr to be beneath himself, refer-
ring to one of the above quotations from - Hr. Ira ’ley, ^hich T wish to re-
peat, I shall consider this point definitely closed by appealing to his own
s
express words: "Short of the /> solute
,
fod cannot rest, and having reached
that goal, he is lost and religion with him."
* «
#
But having denied personality "in anything like its ordinary sen re"
i
to his Absolute, thus precluding the theistic Hod, ,r-e have left in place
of the vanished Person, at the very beat
,
only a pantheistic god w-hi ch
he calls the Absolute
,
w rely the sue- total o r' all things ’’•hose only re-
ality consists in the asserted fact t at each is a part all and that
all depend for their actual reality up or the partnership o r each. T hat
does he say this 1 hi r: g ',rhi ch he di privies by persistently ca ; ita.lizing
it? T e have already noted how he rerea t edly calls it a 1 system* . H o far as
I can see this /d solute is nothin*’ more r or less than the or e a* solute
universe. He refers to the Absolute as being "ir.rarer t alike through every
region o n appearance," but sir re he ha s also declared, as ' r-e saw efore,
that "the 'Absolute is each appearance
,
ar 1 is all," he has uttered the
profound (?) truth that t he / v solute is j r: p rer.t in itself ! His ’"hole treat
rent of the Absolute rakes it clear that he wishes it understood beyond
cavil that every sense of transcendence is flatly debarred, ar • that true
personality is positively excluded.
The theistic philosopher recognizes the ’divine immanence,’ to be sure,
but he also recognizes the ’divine transcendence’ as "-ell, ’”hich alone
makes such a thing as personality possible. The abolutistic, or panthe-
istic, philosophers seem, to be laboring forever under the delusion that
the beli ef in a god is always a case ’ ei t her -or 1 ’"hereas it is a case
of ’both-a.rd. 1 By this I me a r that they seem to think that * ~od* rust be
ei t ' ler inmanen t or tre.r seer den t
,
’"her-'as the theistic philosopher bslieyes
that Ho T is n oth the one ai d the other.
Upon such an- affirmation as this, the absolutist is likely to feel
it the perfectly proper thing to throw up his ha ids in horror,' thinking
t
that his .just sense of intellectaul pride has been outraged, and exclaim,
"Sirs, how can this thing be?" To this the theist is satisfied to point '
A A
out an analogy, *"hich, while it doe? rot explain ho-- it is possible, does
pro that it ir_ possible
;
rarely, the immar. ert -trar seer lent nature of
all human beings. They ore immanent in the sense that ir rorral health
their spiritual nature extends to e^ery muscle end fiber their physic-
al bein^ • Ir: this sense they are truly immanent ir their bodies. At the
same time ro one car reasonably deny that there is also a sense ir. ,r*hich
they are truly trar seer dent
,
ir that t *eir spiritual r a ture is not exhaust-
ed in mere bodily functioning. Tor whi le me feel that ,r e are truly in our
bodies, i"e are as truly in another sense "part from ~rd above our ' bdies.
X'e do not experd all our spiritual ^orce in merely keeping our physical
bodies functioning. The highest rant o*' our natures is concerned ' r’ith think-
ing, feeling, ar ", shilling, in a sense a' o^e and beyond the things that touch
our bodies, he are conscious, of somehow positively standing apart from our
1
.
bn ties ai d looking at them and contemplating them.. v e express this underly-
ing thought when ^3,use such expressions as "I have a body”. 7'ere me really
recognize the fpct t lat we a re a. eri or to the body so t ant we ; oss.es a the •
bodies ,rrhi rh v e cortrol. he nima-rs feel that cur real 'f^l^ss
,
1 our 'person-
alities,' are not sirply and only immanent in giving life to and morning and
using our bodies. It. is the tmr scer.der t ,r‘ill that decides to rove a certain
i: ember
,
it is the immanent will that executes the or der
.
Now this analogy o^ the immanent -trar peer: dent hurra n- spirit makes quite
clear the theistic conception of how the ~od o" our thinking cay be ir_ this
physical universe to its utmost ^iber
,
‘ hile at the same time he may be per-
sonally superior to and above it. In his life-giving ar. d vitnlizing character
he may uphold w d control the entire phenomenal universe to its remotest
bounds and to its ultimate indivisible essence. Ir his hi -her, or personal,
capacity he may be a" le to stand apart from and contemplate every yart cf
this physical order, '••ill its actions, kro,rT its objective, ?r.d think apart

hr eat. Spirit."from the problems that deal simply with this ''tody of the '’’rent Ft . "
So the t heist says to the ’ ei ther-or * advocate, before 3' ou reject the possi-
bility o r the immar. en t-trar.scer&er.t Sod, claiming that such a position is
absurd, please convince a mar. of the pragma tic-pi losophic mind that the human
spirit is not itself an example of the very thing "’hi oh you reject outright
as most assuredly inapplicable to the Being whom. ' r e call hod. Bor the prag-
ma.tic method certainly compels us rot orly to accept ^acts t vat car. be abso-
lutely explained in their ’ how* ard ’why’, but those ’"hi ch do exist even though
by us inexplicable in their deeper natures. Y’e kno"’ many things ’"hich rs can-
not begin to ex lain, ar i i.t seems to me that ore of the crying blunders with
much so-called philosophy 0** the more preter tious type is ir. just this very
respect; namely, that, facts must he explained in all their rwhys 1 and ’where-
fores’ before they will be admitted as trustworthy evidence in reaching other
facts ar. 1 possibilities. Because I see numberless examples of finite" spirits
that are both immanent and transcer den t. every d-y of my ii r e
,
I insist that
i^ pragmatic reasons as a '"hole demand that the ultimate source of things is
a hod ’"ho ir both immanent arm transcer bent, then T shall be allowed to hold
as reasonable, yea., as most reasonable, that’ explanation ’-hi ch posits such a
Being ir stead of this pantheistic monster of ro great girth that all things
which exist must somehow subsist buckled up ar d squeezed together within the
circumference of his waist -Band.
/•t this juncture it is conceivable that some devotee of sophistry may
exclaim, "Oh, that is not what I. mean by immanence and transcendence." To
which ejaculation we reply, "But t ’cat is wha t " s and ’"hat pragmatic
^olks always mean ’"hen they use the words, an 1 if you do not ?• esn the seme
thing, then you a re talking about one thing ard mean another. Consequently
we must close our discussion unless you are wiliirm to rake words mean what
1
they say and s ay what they mean, for we are not concerned so much just now
O c,
W
about manufacturing a r ew language as alout, learning 4 o u?e in a sensible
wa 7 t •13 la rgua ge we air sa dy po s s e s s .
How after this analysis o'” Pradleya.n absolutism, it is certainly clear
that re were amply justified in saying at the outset that it ir so far from
being the friend o*' ail thsistic philosophy as to be its irreconcilable foe*
The most hopeful thing to say about, it is that it is pantheistic, ^rd I fail
to see any impropriety or injustice in calling it outright atheism. Put be-
cause the word ’Absolute* has often been used ir the Christian sense of '(rod,'
many readers who hame picked up James’ ’’Pragmatism” and r ad far erough to
discover that ho had declared nfpr arrainst the Absolute were at once ready to
file in the face of all pragmatists as ?r ungodly lot ’•ho were seeking to
overthrow the Christian's Cod, whereas in feet. Professor James ray be said
to have been trying to rescue him from the clutches of the Pradleya.n panthe-
ists ,rrho were insisting on transmuting him into a mere ’aspect,' a 'mere ap-
pearance.'
Certainly it would be difficult, irr os r j lie , let us say, to conceive
of a thing more far-removed from the Peing ,rre ordinarily think of --hen we
use the word 'Cod' t :iar is this Absolute o^ Hr. Bradley, before which we are
commanded to bow down and worship in the rare o^ orthodox philosophy. If the
Bible is to be regarded as having any substantial wiue whatever in its
teachings concerning the nature of Cod, the pantheistic tenets of this phi-
losophy must be rejected outright as wholly fallacious at. their wary heart.
The consistent teachings of the Bible concerning r
-o d are too well known to
reed examination here, cod is therein set forth as a Personal Being in whose
«wa ge a ns. by-horn rarkiro ’.as been created
,
capa' le of coir union in a real
sense. He is worshiped as ore capable of being ” touched by a feeling o^ cur
infirmities .” Jn short, he is clear 3 y set forth as what Jo ’in Pi ske calls a.
•qua si -human Cod. '
0r
connect! on to 'Trhi oh of t Vis two ioIt is not my object in this
correct
,
but it bos been my desire to show their irreconcilable natures.
Ira die yon absolutism or d fhristiar theism corn ot dwell together under the
some roo.f
,
ray, in. the sore universe, '"hey ere mutually exclusive . Either
David must slay Goliath, or ^olieth will slay David. To ground arms is im-
possible. for sequently it is a case of beet or be beaten, eat or be eaten.
!
To one car read Professor fames' v-rj t irgs • carefully , it seems to me,
as they bear upon the point in question, ar i fail to see tdiat he is square-
ly on the side of ^od a s against this /I; solute . /rd ,r,her once we stop to re-
flect upon the matter ir hand, the truth becomes apparent that ei ther this
transcendental philosophy, which kro ,rr s rot the toil arc heart-ache of the
common man's lot, has somewhere missed the way and reeds piloting back to
the beaten track of common sense, or else reljgior for the intelligent must
forever cease, and we can well post the sign over the gateway to philosophy,
wrho Enters Here Leaves Hope Behind."
Pragmatism in this, as in other matters, is a challenge to return to
a reconsideration first principles o^ knowledge. It refuses to 'ash aside
those general intuitions and native tendencies . of thought as only a delusion.
It proposes to accept whatever -can be kro^n swr though it cannot be explain'
ed.. TThy need the thirsty man refuse to slake his thirst till the chemist and
the metaphysician explain all about the nature and the origin oxygen and
hydrogen? Pragmatism proposes to start with all tangible data and to give
due credence to all the sane matters with which ”’e have to deal, believing
that they have a substantial meaning instead o r a mere deceptive lure.
The conclusion o " this chapter, ther
,
is this: The only sort of relig-
ion that can consistently stand with the teachings o r‘ the absolutists is
pantheism pure and simple, and all those pantheistic religions of whatever
name and kind ’"hi ch masquerade under different names, >ut arc at heart the

sane. Consequently, pragmatism, even if it had rot 2 ait io’-r certain other
principles clearly friendly to theistic faith, could he studied with the as-
put* aroe that it could not possibly be none hostile
i
been considering in t his chapter. But it has started on a campaign against
this arch-foe o^ all w?rc hcarte-' religions vorthy the r are
,
"^r. 1 there is
no ;i a chary' in the war."
f,f*
4
Pragma t i Pi 1' a r. 1 ^lur ^ li sm
/s we sa,tr ir the preceding chapter, r r? "ma t isn pp denned by Professor
James, has declared ’”pr a^irst the /’solute of set "or th "by tile Bradleyan
school o r philosophers. ^*e there showed that this posit ior: is so far f'roE
being ante monistic to theism as to be t he only position of the two which .
admits its possibility. r"h? Bra die yan absolutism is extreme i d '»! istic mo-
nism. It is, as we saw, so ext erne ir its ^teaching as rot or 1; to reduce
all
-exi terce to an idealism (which we personally accept and which p'^agrra-
tists may an 1 do for the roost part accept)
,
but’ also to reduce all individ-
ual existence of finite creatures to roe re "seeming*’ d "apr e^nce . Of
course, Bradley is as correct as he is frark ir: stating that his absolutism
leaves no place for theistic faith, and that the only ^od which can survive
his monism ’’is. not the cod of religion." Pragmatism is rot under necessity
of proving this, since Fr. Bradley has relieved others of that task by con-
fessing i-t outright.
fo’w, ,f,hat does the pragmatist, place over against this absolutism, or
radical -monism? Professor James has frankly d-clared ir: favor of pluralism.
lUmzy readers after getting that far with his "Pragma tism" lay it down, feel-
ing that they have read enough for ore day. Frequently they never take the
book up any more, or if they do so it is ,,r ith a set opinior that its au-
thor is a rank pagan who believe? in a plurality gods! lie has s n id that
he is unalterably opposed to the -Absolute, and now he a d d s the second touch
of horrors by declaring for pluralism, and what is all this but to say that
he disbelieve? in ir. the "ore true/ and everlasting Pod," or the one hand,
c$
while re^e rting to some such polythe i sir. as the ancient '"-reeks ard Tomans
were accustomed to vererate
,
on the other? T’e Pf"r in the preceding 3 hop ter
that the Absolute which he opposes is something entirely dif ferer t and un-
alterably opposed to the "oi o~ theistic i th. "hat ought to strip one -
half his philosophy of its terrors to orthodox the j s ts
,
an
' ' ake him a
tolerably respectable heathen after all. It remains to be seen if - the other
half, namely, his pluralism, has rot been quite as ger -rally misunderstood
as has the Absolute which he opposed. Such cor si beration is the object o*
this chapter, and we anticipate a briefer discussion than in the preceding
one
,
Prom the foregoing investiga tion and reflection i t r o ,,r seems to me to
be ir order to make or.e important observation, an:1 that is, that we should
not permit ourselves t, 0 become confused through the fact that, the sane words
are often used by different philosophical writers in ~*i dely different senses
We can appreciate any writer's true position orl 3r by learning his spirit
and knowing his view-point, "his cannot be done by merely qlareirg along
to see what he claims to be his attitude toward certain '"ords . be must know
what con ter j he gives to these ,r’ords. be how this bef figging '"as fre-
quently arisen in the mir.ds of mar y through confusing the word Absolute
with the theistic (rod, for while the ~*ord is used by some writers in this
sense, frequently by Christian philosophers, it is used, as abundantly
saw, in quite another sense by Hr. Pradley a nd his school o " thinkers. The
t ,rro serses are completely antithetical. To attack the word in one of these
senses is to defend it in: the other.
bTe know from the wri tings of Professor James, if we have pursued them
extensively
,
that he was p firm, bc-lierer in the existence of the theistic
Cod. He has taken pains to say clearly that in opposing the /bsolute he

’vas not opposin'” the d of Christian worship, and t her called attention
to the fact that nolrhirg could he farther from the Chr j s tiar. idea of '~-od
than this ^11-ii jlusive Absolute. It certainly ought to ha-w© occurred to
0^0 ry reader familiar with the two writers that Hr. Pra.dley’s /b solute
is in suhstar.ee and ir. reality simply * he Urkrowa.bl e of Herbert Ppencer.
It is this dir. or 1 Tizzy thirg-of- things
,
unknown ar unknowable
,
intangi-
ble and ur-ge t-a.t-able
,
that Professor James an :1 his school of pr agratis ts
ha re so unsparingly assailed.
Y:ha t has Professor Janes really done in 'declaring ^or ‘pluralism 1
as against * absolutism 1 ? Has he thereby declared "or either a pluralism
of gods (polytheism) or a Tualistic universe (dualism)? Is this alternative
the only meaning ,r'hich he could ha Tre ha l ir mird -’her he used t he word?
I note that Doctor BOwnein his "Theism," page 59f
. ,
dismisses ir one par-
agraph as untenable "the p^luraii sm. of ° • or tareous thought." Put does he
what James means by the word, 'pluralism 1 ? Doubtless, many have thought so.
I do not think they were talkirg about the same thing at all.
In Baldwin's Dictionary of Philosophy we find this: "Pluralism is the
theory that reality consists in a plurality or multiplicity of Ustinct be-
ings." Y’e learn also ir the same, definition, further or
,
that it may be
materialistic, spiritualistic, or indifferent, etc. There we read also:
"Howison employs it to denote the substantially distinct existence of free
ethical personalities."
N lTo,rf
,
from this definition and from the works of James ar. i Pcvne, I
believe that, from the pragmatic star dpoint
,
these two men were conten ding
for the same thing under different rare?. Doctor Powne ,r,as ar. ardent be-
liever in "the substar. tislly distinct existence of free ethical personali-
ties," such as we ourselves are. Hence he was just as much opposed to Brad-
ley's Absolute as James, ar d just, as much a. 'pluralist 1 in this Ilowisorian
sens e
,

Throughout the writings of Poet, or Bourne , ’"3 ^ir i him cor; ter ling for
juft v T ha t Professor James contends for, ”r • that, to o , for purely
reasons:— the conservation of free —ill on trie fart of : ini te ct ea i .u e.- nd
the consequent truly ethical character of human actions. Especially toes he
elaborate this doctrine in his '’Personalism.” Tr fact, he might truly be
classed as a genuine pragmatist, for he -as that, however much he himself
may have ridiculed t ha word. His object ana his met .od 1 ere „o ni de -ply
pragmatic* that is, u elia^ed above everything else in the value of mr-
crete interests as opposed to those purely speculative.
How, as to tie full content of the idea of 'pluralism’ as it existed
in the mind of James, it. is not strictly pertinent to this discussion to
speak, I do not recall that he has anywhere ’ said or ever in timated that he
believed in a pluralism that was necessarily a community of eternal and ux-,
created free spirits. I do not recall that he ever took a position '-hat
all these at-present free personalities may not have been created origi-
nally by or sprung from the original ore Person. Jo far as I know, lis plu-
ralism deals only with the fact that n ow our luman spirits are ' free ecfiical
personalities,*” leaving un discussed the question as to w etier or not they
are created or uncreated. I do krow that, he was a firm believer in fod as
a Person. But so far as I recall his utterances, I am sure that from the
ora great!
o
star dpoint, ?r 1 possibly from every other, the ’pluralism' of
James and the 'personalism' of Bowne are r.ot contradictory in any essenpgipdl.
The more I read and compare the writings these two men, the more
I are led to feel that as philosophers- they were very close together in some
of the most vital matters about which they wrote extensively. cis is cer-
tainly true as to their antagonism toward this pantheistic and impersonal
Absolute, as we have air ea dy seen, t hen we read James' do'etrine about truth
in its concreteness we are reminded of Bowne ' s i '-pa tierce with what he

calls 1 ’’the fallacy of the ur.iver sal , " that abstract, transcendent order
which is the "bore fire® o'* the Pra lleyan school. IT: s cor si a tent opqo-
sit ion to this ultra-Hegelian transcendentalism Is so well known by all
who have come to know his posi tion as to reed only citation here, "’hen, as
we said "before, they ^ere both ardert a defecates of ir ’i * r i dualism to the
extent of "the substantially iistirct existence of free ethical personal-
ities." -o both of them ’selves’ were real existences, not mere 'appear-
ances’ or creeping shadows, possessing freedom to choose between real
alt errs ti rres
.
Put Doctor Bowne was also a theologian while James was not. As a con-
sequence he naturally carried his work farther than mere philosophy as such
would der&nd. The 'pluralism' of James is left open, so to speak, whereas
Bowne carried the implications to a logical theis + ic conclusion. Therefore
the latter speaks of and insists upon a mor jam • hi eh in_ rar.e as sugges time-
ly rather inimical to James' general work as he left it. Put e-pir I am per-
suaded that the difference was really one of worts. Te kro ,rr that Bowne ' s
monism was a. thing of a different order altogether from the monism of Pra d-
ley. The latter is the monism of rark ar d rabb id pantheism, a monism that
is bulky . T owne ’ s monism is the monism of idealism, To be sure, but the uni-
ty which the problem Bernards is on the personal plane, ro" on the imperson-
al plane. By this I mean that to him the monism ,,ras sound in the one origin-
all, eternal, personal Creator, the Dob of theism; the one Being from whom and
by whom are all things, and "in 'dioin all things consist." Hot only ’id he
create the phenomenal order, but he also created all finite spirits of
whatever rank ar 1 kind, imparting to them of his own free choice a degree
personal freedom also ir all matters in^ol^ing moral questions.
But the matter of real freedom, irrespective of how these t" r o men
might hawe agreed or disagreed oyer the question of these plural exist-
— — _
(%
t
* j
/ences
,
whether they were themselves crested or urcreated, is a matter upon
which they were in most hearty accord, /rd this is just the point which
I have sought to make clear in this discussion of their respective ,-orks,
* pluralism' aid ’personalism*’ .And it is this point which is of tremend-
ous pragmatic-religious importance, an d. it is just this point which, we
rish to consider a little farther in this connection.
V e say that we are inmc i ja te ly cor cj pus o"” our o ,rrn personal freedom
of choice within limits , Tq do not claim to be absolutely "ree, of course,
hut we do claim to have a measure of self-determination as to the direction
we shall travel ?nd ?? to where and how we ’"ill exy end ,r ha t energy and abil-
ity we do have. - ra.r t in g that, as some one has said, our on ly liber ty is t he,
liberty • 0 choose our mart ers , ’whether ~oo o v "ad, still that is a vary pre-
cious and far-reaching liberty, f or that alone gives our actions a real eth-
ical character which they could rot possibly have under any system of blind,
fatalistic pull-and-push.
But the objection is made that we are deceived in the matter, and that
our consciousness of freedom is misleading. T o t ia t T reply that i r we are
mis taken in this, if we cannot safely affirm that we actually know what we
have the immediate witness of through di r ec t cons oi ousness of inner states,
how can we trust our consciousness of what is repealed to us only through
our more or less deceptive faculties of perception and our treacherous pow-
er of pure reason? In other words, i r we carrot trust our consciousness of
inner states wrier e we do not have to feel our way through erception and
pure reason, it is folly to say that we can ever trust ourselves ir regard
to outer matters where at best the consciousness we have is only the con-
sciousness of second-hand knowledge. Con sc: ousness of immediate fact ought,
as a matter of sound common sense, to be more trustworthy than cor. ^pious-
ness o' date fact. In the one case we see eye to eye
,
so to speak
,
and
r r
r
r
c
in the other w© Bee or ly ’’ through, a glass darkly." We cor. r i ,rer "be tore
vividly conscious of cor ii ti ors without than o p conditions vi t 'tin, certainly
To repudiate our corisci ousr ess of personal freedom is to impeach outright
the best attested fact- of all our knowledge
,
°rd by ?o doing ""3 make all
i
knowledge hencefor th a- matter impossibility, for we have giver the lie
outright to the sanest and the ros t persi s ter t verdict o p our mental powers
Absolutism ir Lose! upon . the impeachment the credibility o'" our facul-
ties, however much its advocates boast of their worship of irtelli ter.ce.
On the contrary this plurality of ethical centers makes place for the
trustworthiness of these same ^acuities under normal conditions. Tr fact,
pragma tism throughout honors our native impulses o -0 thought u] or which we
are constantly force! to rely as if they were trus
t
,vor thy
,
checking them
up so far as possible by the exercise of our reason. Pragmatism believes
that the philosophy -hich rejects outright these, the most uriwm sal ard
deep-seated rative convictions, ir order to go chasing after transcendental
rainbows that, forever recede and dissolve into the inscrutable Absolute
where all finite knowledge is mockery v ’ ielusi on
,
is more becoming to
a ma d-man than to a professed sage. In short, trarscer den ta 1 absolutism,
by rejecting tie plurality of free ethical 'selves' and reducing what
they x)ositiweiy knew, if finite knowledge is at all possible, to sheer
*
ignorance and idiocy^ sags this, in subs ta ce
,
is its bed-rock tenet: —
Fej act all native instincts ?r. d impulses o p thinkirg as. unreliable un-
less you can first understand and. explain in detail all the implications
and complications that may arise therefrom, that explanation to be made
wholly by appealing ; o just ore part o^ your cor pi ex nature, the reason \
and what you cannot thus prove to be trustworthy is to be branded as
false, a . ire 'aspect* or ' appeatrance. * Pragmatism, or 1 ho other hand,
says: "’rust these as reliable ur J il discovered to be false and contra-

#
dictory. Or to cor tmst the two system? someth? t from the star d[ oin t of
I0 <^r» 1 ter minology
,
eh so? utism says
,
/ssume that oil or ore liars ui til
men are truthful until they ore proven 4 o "be liars.
/nd row we may say that nowhere is this contrast felt more keenly
than just here in this question of absolutism a ga i n s t pluralism. I ecause
we feel confident that we have a power of self-direction, choice, of
freedom, we feel equally confident, that we ourselves are realities and
not mere 5 aspects * or 1 appearances ' of reality. T ’ie trustworthiness of
these two convictions is valid only if 1 oth convicti ons p re true. r'ogether
they stand, divided they fall. Therefore, as James- expresses it, ’’some
sort o p pluralism” is the only hypothesis that can rake these convictions
valid, and hence, by . ja in ta ir ir g J he veracity o r our faculties, conserve the
grounds o^ our human knowledge. Thi ° pluralism refuses to believe that
our individuality is only ere erd. delusive seeming, and that, at the
very bottom o^ all reality, our feet are inextricably stuck into this
tangle-foot of the all-comprehensive /bsolute, so that we can never
in any r -al sense extricate ourselves a r' 1 actually rise an 1 fly "s ir hhi
they are proven to be truthful; while pragmatism says: /ssume that all
r r
0
uals
,
"but must be satisfied to stick there bussing out our little span.
The fixity of this transcen dental ’’system” is most certainly fixing us
also, for, so for a s we ore anything, we ere only ’aspects' and 'appear-
ances' of this immobile creature. So far as we car lay claim, therefore,
to having ir ii^idual thoughts it is or the assumption that we are a sort
of nerve -cells of this universal etaphysical Train, to use a. figure which
seems to me to express by analogy our lack of individuality, as the system
under consideration implies. Of course, ,rre admit that our independence is
within limits. We are placed in an environment '"hi ch more or less influences
us in our decisions, but still we claim, as "-as said before, that we can
determine the way we wish to face, the course of conduct we will strive
to the best o^ our ability to folio-". V’e maintain that we are sufficiently
free to be moral beings in a real sense ar d rot ifc mere seeming.
I said before that so far as the magmatic ,ralu.o is concerned, thej ,
personalism o^ Doctor Bowne and the pluralism of Professor James are not
necessarily, if a t all, in conflict. These distinguished men did hold
views quite different in many respects, but with such differences we are
not concerned as we Study them from the standpoint o r their ideas that are
of primary importance pragma tically. On page 146 of his "Pro gme ti sm,
"
Professor James says: ”1 must treat the ration of an /,ll-Kno'’rer simply
as an hypothesis
,
exactly on a par logically -"ith the pluralist notion
that there is no poirt o^ -riem
,
no focus of information extant
,
from which,
the entire content of the universe is visible at once. ' ~od' - conscience,’ .
says Professor T"oyce
,
'forms in its wholeness ore luminously transparent
conscious moment' this is the type of noetic unity or: ’"hi ch rationalism
insists. Empiricism or +he other hand is satisfied with the type of no at-
ic unity that is humanly familiar. Everything gets kno"n by c om.e knower
cQ
along with so ething else; but the kroner s ir. + 'ie erd ray he irre tucitly
mary , and the greatest kron er o r them ail ray yet rot kr
o*
,r the whole of
everything
,
or even know whet he does know at one single stroke.”
The essential point in this eon elusion o° Professor Tores is that
while the universe is noetic, or krowa.ble, it may not all he fully and
finally known as a completed unit hy any one or hy oil kroner s , rot
even hy the Ghief Kr.owe-r whom we call God. This position may not he so
ir consistent after all as it may appear at "irs t glance. Tor we know that
there haw3 been many earnest Christian theologians who ha^e contended that
the omniscience of "od as claimed in the 1'ihle is rather perfect knowl-
edge of things that no Trr are rather t '? n a detailed knowledge of what is
yet to he, which does not debar the hypothesis that he does kro 1" of the
final outcome. It must be admitted that there is much scripture for lead-
ing us to believe that there are certain '-oral problems which Cod is real-
ly striding earnestly to work out through and with us mortals, and that
in the detail he is seeking to kr ow ’"ha t ,r, e are worth and how much h can
depen d upon us
.
Prom the standpoint of personalis ts 0^ the idealistic type this posi-
tion seems to me not only to be permissible but the only consistent posi-
tion tenable. If the whole phenomenal universe is ’’speech,” the language
of the Divine Kind, addressed ir part, at least to ^irite intelligences such
as we ourselves are, and if it is the purpose 0 0 that Creator that we should
in a limited sense, create our own universe by thinking i t f or ourselves as
we come to know ewr more and more its deeper 'mystery ar. 3 possibilities,
are we to suppose that this Creator has been thus speaking pher omenally
the whole completed universe an 3 is e^en now toirg it, long before there
was and is any finite mind to receive the deeper details of -r*ha t will fi-
nally be functioned by the Supreme Kind when the finite mind is able to
c c
t
receive it? It has ior g appealed to me tha t since the phenomer a l ur.iverse
is this functioning the Supreme find for the pe^eeptior, at least in
part, by some finite mind, it is hardly reasonable .t ha t the fuprer.e Find'
has functioned as -et the completed universe, "hue ''sr eaking 1’ tie thoughts
into the completed phenomenal universe "•hen there was ro other person who
'res re; ^red to ''ear it. Fer^sor * s philosophy, as 'r e kr ow
,
is the philoso-
phy o^ active life, ar t it is. his theory that, there is and probably will
rore^er be a further dev rlopmcnt and unfolding from ,rTi thin
,
a ceaseless go-
ing on from good to better and fror better to best, '"his is also the be-
lief of many of the most pious and earnest Hhri sti«r thirkers. Personally,
it appeals to me on the philosophical basis that life is acti on , and eter-
nal li re mean - eternal acti on . Certainly it -"ill rot act, by going round and
round in a monotonous circle rather than by moving forward in a line. The
only apparent, reason fa r assuming that it will be a completed circle is
t ie idea perfection as life completed in its e^ery de + » il ar ^ the r or. si -
biliti es of any further a War cement ex's? us ted . v”io h* s °ry right to thus
limit the posibili ti es of the Creative Force thp t we t heists c* j 1 0-od?
J
To,rr if there is to be infinite ar d eternal progress, a progress
toward which the finite mind brings something in the way o'p actual creation
if only f r itself, if does not seem to me that ,rre need to assure a complet
ed and hence static universe from all eternity, as the /bsolutists do. Of
course, a completed universe rears a motionless universe, urless it implies
constant tearing do, ' ,r ard building up again, just as children tirelessly
tear down and rebuild cob houses.
It may be objected that time is only our finite ,r^y of perceiving
things, and that th the infinite it is one eterr °I row . I am aware of the
cy of this argument, but still we are all bound to admit that from the

s tsndpoint o " firite ir t elli gen ces whi ch ’ ; -erronalism, ’ or 1 j luralism, ’
assumes
,
t lere is a p3dps o^ succession
,
and that there ip bound to be suc-
cessive cresti on
;
that is-
,
successive creati or o ' hr a 1"! e d'~ e por 1 h- i r. di -
^i dual , vhis being the case the or ly "'ay the toe trine o** the Absolute can
stand as formula ted by I'r. Pradley is necessarily J o declare that ’’irite
’selves’ are only ’aspects’ nr-1 ’appearances
,
’ for i ° they are anything
real, then their ~uccessi ve steps in krowled^e are also r e° 1 ere a t : ore, of
knowledge /,ov 1 r i t a area tur es . ar ' t re moment any sort of ac tual ercti on ,
whether of phenomena or o:n t bought
,
is admitted the philosophy of the /bso-
lute ceases to be tenable, I feel personally that the root of this idea of
such an Absolute is the idea that perfection implies ir activity
,
idleness,
an eternity of loafing, an 1 at bottom the thought that even the Absolute
has reached the limit o r possibilities as to future de^elo i rnent
.
fuch a p hi -
losophy contradicts itself, t lerefore, by assuming that the Absolute is lim-
ited by having reached the bounds of all that is possible. Is not Per.gsonian-
isifl, on the contrary, for more logical by assuming that there is no limit to
the developments that ^i 11 forever move out ir a straight line, rather than
that theory which reduces all motion to mere seeming in the first place and
then insists that even that must travel in a succession of circles?
Fow this theory that accepts the actuality of 1 "eive? 1 squares itself
with the epistemological fact that the individual minds ,r,ork over, or assimi-
late, so to speak, the "raw material” in the common -to -a 11 objective order,
and thus contribute something real to the creation of the finite nature of
1/
the universe as it exists for our thought. Thus in a porse it ir true that
we all create our own universe, but it is also true that we create it out
of the material that is given us, just ar *^e create our o’ frn bodies by assim-
ilating wha t i° furnished us as "ood. Persoralists r? turallj*- assume that the
Creator o'" our spirits depends upon their co-operation in forming the
I
universe
,
?t least as it exists f or finite in telli -erces. He it? de them
little creators, we may say
,
par taking o <r his o ,rrr creoti v •> nature "*hi ch
he voluntarily imparted to them. Christian theists , pv- 1? the fatalistic
Calviristic school, have always held as ar intrinsic element ir their phi-
losophy that, just in this ,rsry fact the possibility o r co-op era "ins i*'
•'•orkir g out the moral ideals of Cod lies the moral re ponsibility of our
conduct, ar : 1 hence much has heen made of the thought that "'re are ,rrork:rs
together with Him." Ary system oC thought that "'i lutes this ’ clief to in-
sipidity by reducing all our actions to mere e or i t - fl r ’ denies to us the
solemn ra -;t of actually "o ir;g something which. the Creator ar
’
’"oral Govern*
or intrusts us "*ith performing, tie same .is a system which explicitly or
implicitly reduces life from the plane of actual labor to ore of childish
play, ar d at the same time destroys all ethics ar 1 their very presupposi-
tion. Christian philosophy, i f consistent, shares the conviction expressed
in the controversy of Stradivari with the critic who ri liculecl his con-
viction that Cod had actually assigned him the work of making violins.
'That! were Cod
At fault for vi 0 pi rSj thou absent?"
"VeS
;
He were at fault for Stradivari's work."
'Thy, many hold Ciuseppe's vp 0lirs
As good as thine."
"Kay be: t he 7 arc differen t
.
His quali ty i e cl in e s : he a po? Is his her cl
Tith overdrinking. Put were his the best,
He could not work for two. Ky work is mire,
And, heresy or not, if my hand ^lacked
G'
, -MI
I should rob Pro a- since he is fullest good
Waving a blank instead o^ violins.
I say, TTot r-o d himself can make mar's best
Vi t 'lout best mar. to help him.
'Tis To i yi^e s skill,
Tut not without men 1 r hands: He could not make
Antonio Straii^ari’s violins
Without Antonio.”
ITo^, if Tod depends upon the finite creatures to elp him actually
f orrn the perfect more 1 order
,
the mor^l uri verse, so to speak, is it un-
reasonable to say, as epistemology affirms
,
that he also d trends upon them
to help him form the thought orler, the thout tit ur i v er s e ? This co-oijern-
tive creation of the Supreme being working in conjunction ,rl th the finite
beings seems to ha ye beer the original plan o f the Creator who fashioned
us for this yery end,, ar ’ endowed us therefore with these perceptive-
elab o wr ti ve fa.cul ties.
This being the position of pragmatism, it is evident that a plurality
of individual spirits is the only position that "i 11 square itself with
t’-'feistic belief. Ii the Christian scriptures vre see ~od consistently set
forth as an earnest Person with actual work to do an" moral problems to
solve an l depending upon our personal attitude to either pber.ce or retard
the work, '“his does not mean necessarily
,
as the opponents sometimes say,
that the future is wholly at sea. Our action is, as wg ha^e said, ”hthin
certain limits. V’ithin those limits we lo a real work o'" some sort accord-
ing to what we freely choose. As individuals we may abuse our highest pre-
rogatives
,
p n d as individuals we rw v . many o r u° do . lose our possid il
i ties of eternal good. An -" "Tor all we know w© may ever tually
,
some of us,
by our wilful persi tence in wrong-doing ar :1 neglect of pr i',rilege
,
cease to
-
.
c r
r
exist. Pi together, as certs in teachers belie re. Put all that, does rot ire-
ply that the ultimate moral kingdom of truth ?r 1 v' rkteousnesa ay ' good
shall be prevented for those who behave as they ought to behave.
I
T
or is this philosophy so bold as to assert that this is the only
possible universe that ^od couH 1 ha^e made. Jr fact
,
1 there ray be other or-
ders o r ^eali tv , so far as ire know, of ,r’hi ch we nor are ard • may rorever
be totally i,grorar t
,
be cause ,r'e ha v e neither eyes to see r or yet e°rs to
hear them. There may be, and probably are, what doctor Po ,r,ne calls ” inter-
acting spheres.” T’e are not, I say, contending that this universe of act-
ual finite beings vfio help in the creation of the developing order is the
only universe either possible or actual. Pul t this is . our
universe as it is
.
an d we should seek to understand it as it exists
.
For my part, I am not staggered, nor am I discouraged, by a philos-
ophy such as this. It is refreshing to me to think o r a. God so human-like
,
and yet so opti' is tic
,
so approachable
,
who takes us poor mortals into such
a partnership, and ’"ho asks us to share with him rot only the best that he
now has but what, he is going to ha^e later on. For me, a rd I think ^or the
masses of the. most earnest folks, there is satisfaction in this thought of
God forever lea ling out and on ar 1 up, passing from the lo"rer to the higher
ceaselessly creating ever better and better orders. To me a topless heaven
is core to be desired thar one roofed omr and .walled in; a life of eternal
but untiring work and progress is more to be hoped for than a li^e of eter-
nal idler ess ar i sight-seeing.
o'
Ohs nter IP.
Prygma t i sm a rg "ruth
It i F5 quits generally agreed, I think, that pragrratism has beer at-
tacked more vehemently hr its conception of the nature of truth than for
anything else, '"her e^or e it is ir order that irre should look carefully in-
to this controversy and ascertain, if re car
,
.just ” Thet there is of merit
and demerit in this n ewly-formule.ted i hilosophy.
t e start with the assertion that the truth of an idea is that prop-
erty in it which works, or we say t ha t. true ideas work. It is for us to
examine the meaning of this assertion. "'Truth, a.s any dictionary rill tell
you, is a -property of certain o^ our ideas. It means their * agreement
,
1
as falsity as ans their disagreement, with 'reality.* Pragmatists and in-
tellec tuali. sts both accept this iefininition as a matter of course. They
begin t.o quarrel only after the questior is raised as to '"hat may pre-
cisely be me ant by the term 'agreement,' and what by the term 'reality,'
when reality is taken as something for our idea? -to agree wi th. " ("Prag-
matism,
"
p. 198). /gain, "True ideas are those that xrr e can assimilate,
validate, corroborate and verify. Palse ideas are those that we can not.”
(Do
.
p. 201). "Let me begin by reminding you of the '"act that the posses-
sion 0 s* true thoughts means everywhere the possession of invaluable instru-
ments o** action; and that our duty to gain truth, so far from being a blank
command from out of the blue, or a 'stunt' self-imposed by our intellect,
can account f or itself by excellent practical reasons." (Po. p, 202).
"Primarily, and or, the common-sense level, the truth of a state of the
mind means this function of a_ lea di r g tha t j s, v r or th Tr, hl le . " (Po. p. 20 " ) .
<*
H
"Truth, in these cases, meaning nothing hut erertual verification, is man-
ifestly incompatible ,cl th dress or our part." (To. p 2Q r ) .
,nT
eri f
l
ability of wheels and weights and pendulum it as good as verifica-
tion. *' (fo. p. 207). "Put this all points to direct face-to-^ace^erif i ca-
tions somewhere, without which the fabric of truth collapses like a finan-
cial sys ten ,r 1 th ro cash-bas-is whatever." (^o. p. 206). " 7 r i r j : 1 1v or on ly
r. o ten t j ai ly verifying rroce s n es ;: gY thus t e true as well as full verifica-
tion-processes . " (^o. p. 208f . ) . "Our ideas must agree "ith realities, be
such realities concrete o r abstract, be they f^cts or be they i rir.ciples,
under peralties o^ endless, inconsistency and frustration." (To. p. 211).
At the peril of being accused o^ long-wir dedness
,
I am ’oing to add
to the above, further quotations from the same book, hoping to justify my
act later on. "To ’agree' in the widest serse with a reality car, only
mean to be guided either straight up to it or ir o it° surroundings, or to
be put into such w orking touch with it a s to handle either i t or some hing
corrected —ith it better than if "re disagreed ." (To., p. 2l2f.). "In the
end and eventually, all true processes must lead to the face of directly
verifying sensible experiences somewhere
. -hi eh somebody's ideas have cop-
/
ied." (To., p. 215), "Truth' is made
.
just as health, wealth and strength
are made, in the course of experierce." (To., p. 216). "The 'facts’ a hem-
selves meanwhile are not true . They simply are , truth is the function of
t ie beliefs that start and terminate among them." (To,
,
p. 225). "It is the
nature o r truths to be validated, verified. It pays for our ideas to be
validated. Our obligation to seek truth is part of our gereral obligation
to do what pays. The payments true ideas bring are the sole why of our duty
to follow them. Identical whys exist ir the case of wealth and health."
(To., p. 230). "In the case of truth, untrue beliefs work as perni eious-ly
'.
.
.
in the long run as true "beliefs work beneficially. v (Po. , i . 231).
The foregoing quotations from the "best, known pragmatist ought to suf-
fice to make pretty clear the main contentions with regard to ,rrha t the ; rag-
ti st means "by truth. It is my earnest "belief that Teat injus ti ce has "been
done pragma tisra by misunderstanding and misrepresenting it P teaching concern-
ing this a-gry matter. In what ^ ollows T wish to make clear what I under-
stand to be the teachings o'p pragmatism with reference to the nature of
truth.
First
,
we cannot help observing that workability o^ truth is held to
be a. prominent aspect o f it. It is claimed that truth works better than
error. By this it is not meant, ard the pragmatist should not be understood
as meai ing
,
that to "work** means to work in ary narrow sense. Pragmatists
have been accused of saying that truth works best in a materialistic sense.
Because it is frank in claiming an' empirical test, it is assumed that that
means a test in material things. It has also been claimed that it is to be
a test by the individual, e^ery man for himself. Fow the fact is that such
a charge is as unjust as it is erroneous. It is alleged that ~ r agm.a ti st s
hold to a theory concerning truth <rThich, i^ followed to its logi cal con-
clusion, amounts to about this: Truth is what ,,rorks best, and wha t works
best is truest; therefore if at any time you p ind out that a lie works
better than the truth, you a r' a rot only justified in telling a lie, but
you are a liar if you tell the truth.
Pragmatism does maintain that truth is from its very nature a means of
Jpastery. It is a tool, c-o to speak. It is useful to those who have it.
who have it are not necessarily human beings, rot necessarily created beings.
But the truth is useful for mo me intelligent being or beings. Ir fact, prr -
jamtism maintains that truth is not something -dii ch erists apart horn all in-
telligence whatsoever. It may be truth so profound that it is beyond the

range oP were human grasp
,
beyond that e^er o r artels, i n there be
beyond the grasp of ell ir telligences saw? the Supreme Irtelligenc
t heists coll Hod. Pragmatists maintain that truth is not something
ists as p lofty ’’system” sport, from concrete existence, apart from
comprehension by intelligence somewhere. Poet or Po’-ne opposed this
angels
,
e whom we
whi ch ex-
r c tual
t oeoretic-
al universe of lavs ,r’’ii ch vere supposed to exist somehow sport from intelli-
gence and °port from actual facts. Ke denominated it ’’the folio cy of the uni-
versal." Those who ore familiar writh bis "Epistemology" Tprill- recall how he
takes that folio cy to task for building up a lofty universe o^ mere syllo-
gisms
,
and then after it was completed, subject the actual universe to the
measure o^ this fictitious one, one- where the two clash compel the actual
concrete universe to give ,:Toy to the imaginary one. be recall hov he was for-
ever crying aloud against all that mis-fi.t philosophy *trhich ignores things
o.s t bey ore, ,pThich forgets concrete cases in its zeal for the imaginary sys-
tem o ° its o,rrr airy creation. He insisted that all that is exists for some
intelligence, that everything is on a personal plane. Ho,r ’ far is this from
the identical position of Professor James?
It follows, from the position of the pragmatist, that the truth is ei-
ther kr own or know-able
,
verified or ^erif
i
a 1 le
.
as Professor James juts it.
"There is no difference which does rot make a. difference," sometime, some
/
place, somehow, to some person . Truth is not something that forever floats
^loft as a. cloud-bank. It touches conscious exitence somewhere, "o know the
truth is necessarily to make a difference, and to make a difference implies
action in some serse. It was no ordinary Teacher who said, "Ye shall know the
\truth, and the truth shall make you hee." This is essentially a tic
principle!
But it is not claimed that this principle is the cure-all o ^ mystery,
that ell complexities and perplexities are thereby superable at once or even
in this life. mhe bare principle is this: If we could kno" r positively what
f r
works best of all possible beliefs a nd,t heori es we should be able at ore
and the sane tine to know wd© t the truth is. If we erer cone to that place
in our existence where we car kr
o
,rr this, ,rre shall kr o? r truth in its final
and finished entirety. If there is a perfect truth at + his very ir.irute, it
is not' something that exists in some transcendent sense superior to all in-
i
telligence
,
but it is because it is definitely perceived by s one actual con-
scious intelligence. Put in the nature of the case we nortels are far from
that goal of perfect comprehension
,
and for us truth is ir the making. We
are in the laboratory of personal experience, and we arc adding to the size
I
of our bulk o r truth all the time both as individuals and as a race. While
7/e camot hope ir. this life to know fully, it is a safe principle to apply
the test of workability to our ideas ir the largest sense, "'he ,TTjder our ho-
rizon 'and the better our means o^ comparing °n ^ investigating whe t "makes
"or righteousness" and the general " r elfsre, naturally the rearer we are .ap-
proaching the exalted position of perfect vi sion and perfect judgment of
what the truth is. for t his reason our idea of "-hat works best is a more re-
liable idea an d truer than that of primitive man, or ' even" of mankind with
the slow methods of communicating with one another which obtained even one
hundred years ago. Put we cannot kno r~ all that has preceded, much less can'
we perceive al 1 that is yet to come, f o we sing
"Lo
,
on a narrow neck of land
' Twixt two unbounded seas I stand."
Tq ought to be frank enough to confess that we carrot kno^ positively
what the -final outcome of certain - hilos ophies an" beliefs an " our attitude
to them may be in the future world, this or that we bell eve is conducive to
the largest, and the best, ’ r,e say. Still our faith is our working hypothesis.
r
’e claim that we are justified ir commending or condemning this or that phi-
losophy or religion because of its results in the life of the individual and
society. ii ruits y< shall kno-- them." Ir a pre-eminent sense we

who I: oast that we are Christians roceed to rro ,re the superior! ty of our
religion Toy i to pra.gr©. ti o test* be T oirt to its ac m evemen ts ir cor ore te
inotters on the one hard, ant in .all of its philosophy we ore forever seek-
ing to establish our system by the concrete differ or ces its acceptance or
rejection will moke with the in ii ,ri dua 1 ?r i ,rTt th society mere or he reef ter.*
But as w e hinted above, the test of ^hat works the best is not a test
that can always be applied absolutely. Even t he highest authorities differ
in many matters. Every religionist ,rrho. is sincere would doubtless • claim
that his religion is the most helpful one. 1 ho shall decide? Every politic-
al party claims its o^r practical superiority. VTio shall arbitrate? "'or us
we must under existing conditions test these beliefs and theories by their
results as judged by those who ray resonally be thought the best qualified
to pass an opinion. Haturaily this win be deemed to include those rose
opportunities and training of head an 1 leart are the ,r*idest v d deepest.
The peoples who have cultivated the highest an ' noblest caps cities o_ t.ieir
natures must be the court of last appeal so far as this wor_d is concerned.
Tq do not claim to be infallible (or should rot) , but ,rr e have a right
to claim that we are better qualified to judge what religion and '."hah
political system "work best." than are rule savages or mediaeval peoples
or the illiterate and uncultivated heathen. Thy? Because our inventions
and our immensely wider r°rge of knowledge in every realm of earth natur-
ally give us a better means o^ co paring data an"' noting results. I is takes
we have male and continue to make, but we learn by our follies, and our
knowledge increases.
^
In the sphere of morals, the man on a lo ,,r plane lies because he feels
that for him a lie will work better than the truth. Jut the man or. the high-
er plane has a hder horizon, and he knows that this is a mistake. To of
cheating and stealing ard their opposites until ss have come to regard i t as
1
ac
I s
.
•
•
axiom that " 'lore sty is the best policy.”
Put r 0 wish to repeat that this”' eat working is rot to be confined to
'ere physical, individual, or temporal tests. The °iral truth (if there be
any such thing) o^ any theory or philosophy car ^irwlly be kr.o ,r r: only by
the fir si outcome. Still rs hawe a sufficient amount of lata in many 'irec-
tions to justify us already in making some positive affirmations, because
we do not know everything ,r*e do claim, to know something, /s children we
began ’with certain expectations, me acted upon certain hypotheses
,
and by
experiencing certain successes and defeats ,r, e arrived at certain settled
convictions. So of the race. Our expectations that -re realised we call
true ideas, ard those that clearly disappoint us -e call false, -It is a
fact that in all our ordinary life we estimate the truth of our ideas by
whether or not t bey bring us out where we expected to come out. It is
a settled conviction which we ne ,rer question in rraetical life that the
truth o f an idea is the key to its workability. r'hi « is the bed-rock tenet
of all scientific endeavor. V re seek to prove that our ideas rr? true because
we feel t p t if they -re true they -ill be useful. Civilisation ’ s ideas can
do more than those of -the ^orcer because they are truer, T’e measure the true-
ness of certain economical art social theories by the difference they rake.
v hat can w e finally know o^ the truth or error of any ideas which we now
hold save in the results they finally produce? There may be, for instance,
interacting spheres o^ reality, urkro’-n as yet of each other, and they will
remain forever unknown o^ each other unless sometime ard somehow they can
be brought into sensible contact with each other, a r a then they are bound
to riake a difference, if or ly in the result upon the knowledge possessed
by sentient beings. If this- shall rer come + o pass then truth, for us
,
will take on a larger meaning than urd er existing cor di tions, for our ideas
will have a larger range and content.
.*
dir ec tHare I mi sun derstood Professor Jp^e? in this? Our pr^er is a
reference to the quotations above ^nd to his book entitled ,fr? he Hear, ing of
Truth." To p Ice sure that I hn^e not ^'isir ter pre te d these, I wish. to quote
from a little book er titled ,n"i Hi air Tames," 'y Emile Ibutroux, In the third
chapter the author discusses "Pragma ti sm , " and naturally he deals * r,i th the
definition o^ r^uth as Professor fames taught it. He says: "I r ,: hat, then,
exactly, does the truth an idea consist? It- corsists wholly in adapting
the thought o^ man to reality, /n idea is a prediction. It says: T f you are
placed in a certain set o^ conditions you '''ill see certain phenomena take
place, ""he true idea is the ore which predicts truly: ,n ':ich, put to the test
keeps its promise, "'he true idea is the one which pays, "'hi ch guarantees a •
working remunerative, "hi c h , applied, 'hves u c the lesired hold upon real-
ity. The truth of an idea, then, is not determined by its origin, sensible
or rational, r or by its relation to this or that pri r ciple
;
it only depends
upon its results. r'he truth ar idea is corns t i tu te i by its workings, True
signifies verified or verifiable, roi hir.g less, nothing more." ar 1 again
he says: "Fe should sum up faithfully enough the necessary mi sufficient
conditions of a true idea by defining it as follows: 'That me a ring can an
idea's truth hp ,r 3
,
save its power o'r adapting us either • ;er tally or phys j c -
ally to a reality?'"
Evidently, therefore, the pragmatist takes the full est. possible account
of reality, of "the permanent possibility of sensation," the comm on- to -all
ground of experience.. Tie should be discharged from the unjust ir dictment
of having justified a lie simply because it accomplished the end desired.
Such a charge is too shallow and contemptible to be considered seriously,
save as some honest ^olks ha v© formed ar idea that salipsism is a tenet of
•pragmatism, which is not true, as the evidence clearly shows.

So tier we may spy that. pragma tism is irrevocably committed J o the
tenet that the truth works better than er^or, end that that system -hi oh
has, in the syrette, the most of truth and the least error works the
best on the whole. To substantiate this conclusion as to what pragma ti sin
teaches, I quote from ,tr,hw Principles o r Pragmatism," by It. Heath Bowden,
pa cr© 205: "If the truth be ore thing and the practical consequences a wholly
different thing, then pragmatism is not true. Put if ha^irg practical conse-
quences is necessary to constitute truth, if practical outcome in action or
in some other immediate form experience, such a s feeling, is necessary to
fulfill it even as thinking, then there is reason in a doctrine -hich holds
that ’the truth of any statement cor sj a ts in its consequences'.’ (James). Heed
and supply, stimulus and response, conditions ^rd results, are ’"-ays of stat-
ing the same process from different points view."
But this is oily ore aspect of the question. rhus far discussion of
truth has been confined to the proposition that the truth works better than
error, a r d that efficiency as an empirical test 0 ^ what is truth and what
is not is justified in all capes where that test car be applied. But - hen
it is affirmed that workability is ore aspect of truth this is not saying
all that needs to be said, ror all that the pragmatist, like other folks,
has it in his heart to say. Thile this is a partial definition c° truth it
does not, just as it stands
,
fully cor ply with the demands contained in the
definition of a definition: •'/ definition is a concise description 0 ^ any ob-
ject of thought, and i *• must be of such a nature as to distinguish the ob-
ject described from all other objects," In other words
,
to say that truth
|us essentially efficient and a tool for accompli h practical ends is not a
complete definition. Hence we must consider it further.
Then it has beer affirmed, ard admitted, we hope, that truth works bet-
ter than error, a. perfectly fair an- natural question is, Is it true because
r r
r
it works
,
nr does it ”-*ork b 'cause it is true? Vow t lis question J akes us
right to +he second, rotter to be considered. It has been affirmed, for
example
,
that ragmatists ’cry the obj ecti^e fact, and soy that truth is
for them a mere whim, a solipsistic creatior
How an
'
r ore could e^er ha^e accuse'1 Proves so »" fames °r d his followers
of an attempt to ignore the objective factor is a mystery ,r>hen "*e consider
at all carefully the statemei ts quoted at the outset o'' this chapter. It is
to be admitted that if ore 'were to detach a fe ,rr utter arc es from their set-
tie way to understand ft* t any mar means. His writir 3s should he studied as
a -hole.
That there are those who under the guise of pragmatism might he dis-
posed to be solipsistic ar ' deny all objectivity is another matter. Hut that
is not necessarily pragmatism, much less is it consistent with the plain
teachings' of Professor fames. There are always erratic folks in ar.y camp,
and the whole camp is not to he put under ban 'e cause o r these few freaks,
mention is made of such* possibili ti es here s imply to disclaim any such
tenet as a burden of pragmatism.
Pragmatism 'frankly acknowledges the objective reality ir our shirking.
In order to understand the position 0^ this school with reference to the
nature of truth, it is -pertinent here to make clear ores for a 11 that prag-
matism insists on distinguishing between truth and reality , or fact . Truth
is a property of a correct idea. It is the correctness in the idea; that is,
it is that lea : ir.g of our i ’eas whi ch 'ring 0 us, or tends to' bring us, into
right relations with the reality in its objective raturej which helps us to
handle the reality, to assimilate it, to ’aster it, to use it, to appropri-
ate it.
1

Another thins should he noted in this connection, on:" that is,. that
pragmatists do rot confine the truth of an idea si ••ply to that ,rrhioh has
alrea.W ' een v rr i f i ed: it includes also w-p t is ver i liable . ’"'here is. aJ -—I — I I T I ** 15
'rreat distinction he tween the two, as It. Pratt has said, hut both the
demonstrated and the demonstrable are in eluded in the pragmatic definition.
hut the pragmatist takes note of ore thing often overlooked or denied
in the consideration of the na ture of truth, ant that is, 1 he epistemolog-
ical -problem dealing '"ith the nature of reality. It has been observed quite
fully in recent times that our knowledge is rot given us as re a .Iy-made or
hand-me-down mental garments. v’e are giver the raw material only, '"hin.gs do
not pass from without ' odily into the mind just as they are. Our mental
food is not pre-digested
,
but by way of analogy we may say that, as with cur
bodies so also wi th our minds, there is a certain rusticating
,
digesting,
and assimilating to be tone before the complete body of our mental content
is ours. Y’e pour out o r our mental -lands ar d secretive organs certain juic-
es which not dr ly assist in as'-irila ting hut are in turn assimila ted and
become part of the object o* our knowledge. Plow much the ’’finished pro-
duct” is due to this personal contribution cannot be fully known by us, but
that much of it is this individualistic touch cannot be gainsaid when we re-
flect for a moment that what we ordinarily think as the common object
is quite a different thing to different persons. ITo t”0 swr see anything
exactly alike at the same moment, an' to the same individual it is differ-
ent at different moments.
That much is contributed by the ir li vidua 1 mind is clear furthermore
when we consider the matter of ’’proof.” After- all has been said that can
be said, truthfully there does rot seem to he ary such thing as absolute
proof for mankind at p->resert . Pow often the jury of "twelve good men and
true” hears the same evidence, the same pleas, an I receives the same in-
r.
.
.
.
m m
\
struct ions from the court, only to return the re-^rt o^ a hung jury, and
this, too, in coses where the jurors honestly seek to. decide according to
law and evidence. E^en among the closest friends or 1 under the most sin-
cere end intense desire to know ” the thing-in-i tself ’’ there ere often
— i !e differences of opinion. At "best there ore always differences os to
detail, e^en when the differences ha^e been pointed out.
Now this brings us to the question ’-hi oh the » ragmati st insists on
asking, Is there on absolute line which separates the true from the false
perceptible by a. perfect mind, assuming that there is such a mind? If ideal-
ism is true (and we generally concede that some sort o n idealism is the true
philosophy), and if we concede that all reality is somehow real only in con-
nection with some mind or minds, either finite or infinite; if ,rre concede,
furthermore, that every part of reality, e specially phenomenal reality, is
partially constituted by the mind that thinks it, whether that mind be finite
>
,
or infinite; if we concede this, car we say that perfect Truth is already a
finished product? By that I mean, Are we justified is supposing that truth
is a system already perfected? 17 0 suppose this, it seers to re, is to sup-
pose that there is a " thirg-in-i t'self , " which is not conceded by the leading
philosophers, Furthermore
,
it is to suppose all that transcendent order ,TThich 1
we cave formerly considered at some length and rather suggestively cast
aside, for it was in substance about the same thing as that airy creation, *
" t he falia oy o f the uni
’
r rsal. M / s we p o in te d out i n a. pr ece 7 i r g c hr p t or ,
it hardly seems probable, if the whole phenomenal order is somehow on the
plane 0^ personality, that is, if it exists only in correction wi th mind,
that it is a completed whole a* it is designed to be. In foot, the only way
in ’• ; hi oh we can cake place for a completed Truth is to first provide a the-
ory of a completed universe, so complete that, all charge and motion are ex-
cluded. ’"his is just what creators of the Absolute rave sought to do. If, on
Ir r
. r
e
necessarily 1 pliesthe contrary, development in possible in ary per '-e it
tint with each new development cores some new possibility of thought, °t
any rate for finite creatures^ and if -a t3 irk ir ns e of i cii g things
our o" n ^or our v>npr ehen sion means a cor star t growth ur iers tar. ding ,
then that means- a constant growth truth in the pragmatic sense. If the
phenomenal order is ror the minds that think it partly their o- ?r creation,
how cor: vTe soy that truth is for ary mind os yet wholly a ''irished and tran-
seen dent thing?- far ,,re me or anything more or to what is yet ur thought ty cry
finite mind (and pe rhop s' not yet fully thought by the Pi^ire T'.ind
,
because
not yet necessary) than merely a perfect possibility thinking it? Por
example : idealists mair tair: that space is our own mental contribution, merely
our finite way of perceiving objects. Tierce. when ,rre see an object we may be
said to bring along with us the space in • *hich it is seen to exist, f o in-
finite space is only ar infinite mental possibility, not something actually
existent ever as phenomena, but merely created, so to spe°k
,
as need arises.
An infinite number is also only an ir^irit.e corcei v^biii ty , not an irfinite
actuality, ’’’o such o question, then, as which alternative is true, There
is an infinte space, or There is not or ir ririte space, the answer must ob-
viously depend upon what we mean by the term space.
Ho’TT oil this is not solipsistic. ~ull recognition is given to that ob-
jective order or power or "rVrt e-Ter we ^ish to cadi it which for e-er abides
while we finite creatures come and go. T*e admit that there is a something
which survives all interruptions and abides across all charge. It may be,
if you ’mi sh t o think o^ it as only that, simply a law 0 -r our thinking and
Ijerceivirig. But be i-! what you please to call it, it is somethin g, "‘hi ch we
have to recognize arid something which ,,re do recognize as at least the
given raw material of our knowledge. If it be true, as h^s been said, that
in a sense every percipient being cr ates his o‘r,n universe, i t is equally
.,
.
true t’iat he must create it out of the ms terial tbwt is gi^en him. V’e
look upon the r irite mind, as ^odlike in this at least that it ie actually
creative in part,, that it doe? actually cor cei^e new landscapes that never
existed apart from its own farcies, hut that is a creation, r. 3,r- ';:r theless
.
An d so in every sphere we who are theisticelly minded feel t da t we are in
some real sense actually helping the Creator to raloe the universe, and hence
helping to a k
e
truth by constantly packing into our ideas about, this and
that those leadings which carry us more ar d nor e into the neighborhood of
the various facte. This gives vest to our efforts ar d joy ir our achiever.cn ts
which we could not possibly feel if we believed that Por8ho ,,r the eternal
Absolute had a "onopoljr on all that is doable, and that all that we could
e^er hope to do was merely to s e em to copy its models.
One thought, further, and that is, that pragmatists do r.ot deny that
there are certain completed truths for us, that is, that our ideas have
predicted so well as to lead us into such close proxir ty to reality in
that, particular character as to lea^e no room to Tet rearer. Y'hat ra.gmatism
loes deny is that there is ary such thing as a completed system of Truth,
spelling it thus with a capital - letter. If the universe is yet ir: the mak-
ing, if the Creator is to go on creating indefinitely, forever bringing forth
new out o^ the old and unfolding erer deeper and deeper meanings to reali-
ty, and functioning new phenomena just as rabidly as there are finite
minds to perceive them, how can we conceive such a thing as ar. absolute ys-
t em?
Truth, then, for the pragmatist, we may say in a summary conclusion,
is not only t '-linking efficiently but it is thinking efficiently by getting
into right relations with reality. These are the two aspects of truth ,r'hich
the pragmatist maintains are inseparable: practical: ty and correctness. Or
to put it. differently, truth is not simply that property of our ideas which

• •
brings up into right relations with reality, lut that which gi^es us effi-
ciency as ’- ell. rhe corner ides has beer that the truth of ar idea is r im-
ply that element which gi^es it correctness, rhe pragmatist recognises the
other aspect also. Correctness and efficiency, he says
,
carrot be repara ted.
I ’lave he^rd a. lecturer in a class-room ash (and he iras neither affirming
nor denying): "Are certain ideas which lie at the very foundation of our best
living, though unproved and unprovable for us, at- least ^or the present, nec-
essarily true as to the reality toward which they joint
;
-c a use admittedly
they are necessary in order to bring life to its fulness of meaning and sat-
isfy the deepest longings o " our natures? /re we warranted ir. accepting them
as leading toward the reality which they resolutely postulate when their
chief credential seems to be that that reality is in dispensable to the . high-
est and best in our ir di^id^al ar - social life? Certainly we all feel that if
I
they are not to be thus depended upon, things or --ht +o be so ordered that they
could be. Is this sense of oughtr ess real philosophica 1 worth?" Now pragma
tism is bold enough to affirm that the practical is so closely interwoven
with t be actual that we are philosophically -vr^or t d ir believing that
those .great ideas which are i r di s pe r s a b le to the highest and best achieve-
ments, which work so much better than their opposites, are by virtue of that
very indispersableress attested as true ir the other aspect of truth also;
namely, teat they are leading toward the reality and are hence not destined
to disappoint us if we follow them. Font’s "cata-^or i cal imperative" is in
substance but the pragmatic insistence that the oughtr ess in moral feeling
an 1 thinking' is the most cogent proof of all that is essentially involved
\
in true moral ideas, and especially the fact of a ’oral Being whom we call
Cod. /s we know, this was to him a for more decisive argument "or the ex-
istence of Cod than Fie design argument
,
the common favorite.
r
Pra pma tiREi as a philosophy is the first to aff iris the universal prop-
osition the t truth ha's as ore o^ its aspects or constituent eleven ts the
property of utility. Fo
,
T
"hile it is affirmed or the ore her ! that the true
idea is the ore that' predicts correctly concerning the reality involved and
leads into correct relations with it, it is also affirmed just as positively
or the other hart that the true idea is actually efficient, that it works
he st . V re may say, then, that pragmatically considered, truth presents two
aspects, correctness and i racti cahili ty. 'H^en either' r osi ti vely
,
and you
kro1" that the other is there also.
ff
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Charter -V
Pragma tism an d_ t he P t
h
i c s of r ' : I i " 1 on
The -'rent value of pragmatism is to be four;! primarily, as I "believe,
the V70T k of this the eloping chapter.
Pragmatism, attaching as it does such importance to the efficiency
of our ideas as a test of truth, must necessarily find itself in close sym-
pathy with those deep-seated and all "but universal impulses of our thinking.
Its tenet that the trueness of out1 ideas is determined hy the differences
they make, and that those differences come from the hot that true ideas
predict correctly concerning the reality ard lead us toward it, provides
for the validity of those ir stircti ve conceptions o^ the race universal (or
practically so) '"••hi ch underlie all our true moral life. That are some of
these conceptions?
In the first place, mankind generally p'osits the Divine, as opposed to
the Absolute. Primitive man may he polytheistic Tut his polytheism gives
place through a little reflection to monotheism, generally speaking. With-
out discussing the exceptions ™’hich may he said to prove the rule, it can
safely he affirmed that among civilized people the ail hut universal im-
pulse in worship is to believe in a persoral Pod. All worshipers in the
true sense must he opposed to the /bsoiute if they once know what the Abro-
lute is and implies. Professor fames allows that for a certain few folks,
this loctrire of the Absolute has brought a certain " composure. ” he admit
as much, hut it is the composure of selfishness and indifference. The pan-
theists .(and ; that includes the so-called Christian fcier fists) are certainly

a dreary port folks who peer- to take comfort in the thought that pin
as we fir l it set. forth in the Christian fbriptures art hideously encoun-
tered in daily life is only a "snarl,” a ris -thought
,
"a delusion mortal
mini," ar 1 that all ” rill core out right p omehow in the ^ir^l '•ashing.
The value of this sort o r a religion, if religion it oar. he called,
is sought and found, .as "believe, only by applying the pragra tic method.
Afs you ,T, i 11 recall, we ra de clear t ha t- the pragmatic teat must be ma.de in
the widest attainable Perse. It must include the greatest extent of time
and the broadest survey of the race. It must be broader than the individual,
broader than one little community or communion, broader than ore generation.
It must also be broad er ough to take in all the needs of the’ ir dividual, the
the ration, the race. ]Tor, with this broad test o r the practical and the
good, what can we say, what must we say, of the influence of par theism upon
life an 1 mor al s?
By r ever ting again to ou^ American pantheists, the so-called Christian
Scientists, we must admit that their reli~ior is a narrow and selfish thing
at best, Tcey simply go off as a little company, ^orm a social clique in-
cluding ^or the most part folks o^ the middle or wealthier class, call it
a church, and dignify it by adding the wo rds "Christian" and "scientist,"
and then, like frightened ostriches, bury their bills in the dry sand banks
of other’ Eddy's an ti-Chr is tiar pantheism. Tut what do they say, what do
they feel., of the toils and cares, of the heart-aches and the heart-breaks
of the misery ar 1 the ,,r oe o^ the masses who must plod their weary way
1 trough sin and suffering ar- < death; ay, who reach their helpless hands up
for assistance as they are tossed upon the wa ve s of our fearful human sea,
only to be cast as dead driftwood along our bleak social shores? There
has this clique of dreamers ever established a. s is si on among the slums to
rescue the perishing, feed the hungry, or clothe the naked? There has
m m
»it e^er built- a single hospital, or sent a single "scier t is t" hunting for
a deafly ‘Term? On the contrary, we know how they have criminally ignored
their ora sick a r.d helpless ones until they died of heartless and insane.
.
neglect. V’e know ho ’7 they ''lock vri th their leral here hr.en to defeat every
hill brought before our legislatures to provide r or medical inspection of
our schools aid to regulate sanitary conditions.
But take a wider survey
,
” rhich, as me have just said, is necessary in
order to get. a pragmatic test. V’here shall me go? The answer is, India.
There you ha.ve the fruits of pantheism in their fullest and ripest form.
And he mho will e^en ''or a momer. t prefer that ci "ill rat ion r"ith its base
selfishness and sensuality aid dreamy existence to that practical, active
philanthropic, ar d humanitarian system of the ’’ est, may be said to have reach
ed the place where arguments ha^e no cogency whatsoever, and the presen-
tation o-~ facts and the apj-eal to reason are only a reedless "~aste of en-
ergy. Most certainly he has nothing in common ”'ith pragmatism and the
practical issues of life, character, and destiny.
Thile we admit that that- doctrine has brought a certain sort of peace
an! satisfaction to a certain sort of monkish folks, we unhesitatingly af-
firm that the evidence is wanting to sho,tr that it has brought peace and
joy to as many ''oiks and under as varied conditions as has- the belief in
the existence of a quasi-human Pod
,
the r o r o r theism. The religious experi
er.ee o p its devotees goes ro farther than passive composure. In fact, they
are as much opposed, to religious ecstasy ?r d joy as to sorrow and pain. It
is as much out of place and as un-real to feel goo’ as to feel bad, to ex-
perience joy as to experience pain. Pure passivity is the n E-r T*ana . Anything
that would distinguish one from another or in the least degree accentuate
personality is to be discouraged. V’ithd^awal from all that is experiential,
and retirement, tar toise-like, in to our i -penetrable shell of the /b so lute

are the i denis cherished. r'he ideal is a universal are.es thesis ^hereby life is
to he made insensible alike to Ties sure err] pain. Existence is to become
ne jative ai d should ho reduced as re-T as possible to the punishing joint,
re are to lapse hack into ar d to he again swallowed up hy the Y'hole.
Fow over against the fruits such a belief ,rre point- with pride to
tha t active civilization thdt follows alone ir. the wake of individualistic,
o r anti -absoluti stic
,
belief. /II tat is ir ary sense scientific is its
off-spring. It is rot negative hut positive, not idle hut. industrious, rot
selfish' hut altruistic, rot retiring hut obtrusive. Its hard is forever out-
stretched toward the fallen. And ’"hat is more, it ra.inta.ins that the highest
life and the the most blessed existence car be kro”r. only hy those who learn
"to feel another’s woe," and who "seek rot to he ministered to, hut to irdn-
i Sr ter , "
As a matter of history, it is also true that the majority of those
who haw 8 been reclaimed personally from a life that ,r,as being lived on a low
le wel to a life that henceforth mowed on a high level, who have been lifted
out o^ their old pelves to take their place among* the "twice-born men," have
been thus transformed by the belief ir the Cod o' theism, as truly personal
as the hod of orthodox theology has ewer claimed. Pur ther '-ore
,
this is the
*
only kind o f preaching to-day that reaches or ??r reach the lowest and the
neediest. This dissertation is not designed to be a defense of wha t is known
as evangelical Christianity, but it is a sta terror f of the actual f-cts so far
as I see them, a simple appeal to the wsiue of theism as a~ -> i r; s t the philos-
ophy o' the Absolute.
T ;ir tewer validity ore r ay attach to the belief so far
as the objective reality is concerned, the fact remains that the only relig-
ion that has ewer transformed savages into sages, -"utter -snipes into govern-
ors, and servants into soveri^gss, is that ’which has proclaimed with quench-
ess ardor the religior of a Person
•.
#
Ir. fact, the doctrine of the Absolute implies or 1 ever asserts that
there is really no moral problem to he solved. Vha t seers to he so is i Illu-
sion. There is no such thin." as a distinction betweer good end evil so far
as morality is concerned, fir is a superfluous word.. The teaching of Eddy-
ism on this point is too re11 known to reed citation. Tut I Msh to quote
from the doctrine of the Absolute as set forth ir "Apqea ranee and Teality, 1
'
t ha t classic of the pantheistic school, by hr. Bradley. He says:
"Every flame- of passion, chaste or carrel, would still burn in the
Absolute un quenched ar.d unabridged, a rote absorbed in the note of its high
er bliss." p. 172.
"Tie Absolute is the richer for e^ery dj s cor d
.
sr : for all -tj - ;r si tv
hi ch it embraces . "- p. 204.
"Ugliness, error, and e^il, all are owned by, ar • all essentially con-
tribute to the wealth of the Absolute . "—
-p. 489.
The "-hole moral problem is undermined, and ever the ground is removed
from beneath the foundation, for the assertion is here made' that there is
no discord, no evil, no problem, which does rot make the Absolute better,
and hence is itself ar indispensable good, and being an indispensable good
such things ought to be encouraged and abetted rather than discouraged and
opposed. It is, in short, the philosophy of the baldest type of fatalism.
It can be nothing else, how much soever its n hrocates might disclaim it.
And hence our Absolutist frier ds and dreamers say,
"Serene
,
I fold my har ds and w ait,
Uor ca.re for ,r’ind, or tide, or sea;
I no more ’gainst time or fate,
7or lo ! my own shall come to me.
Asleep, awake, by night or day,
The friends I seek are seeking- me;
Mo ”’ind can lri^re my bark astray,
For change the tide o^ destiny.
"
m<« <r
i
But pragmatism is -baser ti ally the philosophy of action . Ir spite of
the foot t'rt, our Elen tic ri^idists have stood for cer turies shivering on
the "bnnk
,
declaring thn t the river cnnnot he crossed, thnt change all
kinds is impossible
,
the host of pro,gins tic Caesars has gone right on cross-
i ng the Pubic bn , subduihg k i r;g " oms , and setting up empires. Pro grca t i sm .'oes
not propose to s+op moving in order to discuss the problem o^ the possibil-
i ty of motion. The best refutation of the theory that action is impossible
is to go to work. Fo pope o^ the a' solutis t Vatican shall s 4 op our moving
any more than r-uch a decree stopped the movements of the earth when launch-
ed against r-^lileo.
As to the ^act of motion as something real, T wish to pause in this
connection long enough to say that pragmatism, ’"File insisting on the fact
o f motion, is not necessarily ms teri ail f tic ir: its use of the term. But
‘pragmatism insists that in a true sense motion is inseparable from the true
philosophy. Personally, I believe that the only solution of this problem
in its metaphysical sense is that which is found or: the plane of personal
idealism. The fact that tilings do move, and the further fact that motion
in the old stuff-matter world appears to be a logical impossibility, both-
together, leave no other means o f solving the problem ^or thought than by
considering it on this plane. But meantime it seems to be safe to say that
motion is .just as real as phenomena are real. Tf they are ideal, then mo-
tion is also ideal, and sic'e versa..
It is apparent to those who read that the philosophy o r the day is
the philosophy of action . Fo philosophy can possibly fit ir to the temper
of the time which antagonir.es motion in ewr y department of life. In the
realm o^ science, evolution is sleeping everything before it, and the vsry
heart o r it ir movemen t . In the philosophy of Bergson, reality is a c t i ye
through and through. Our organized philanthropies, the crusade against
* f
r
crime and political corruption, the call for c
i
,ri c purity ancT social reform,
all demand a o ti on . The teaching and the preaching which is everywhere ask-
ed ia that ’"hi ch incites to action. Tie philosophy o r the times is militant,
and is literally on the war-path. The test of systems is ,r hrt they can do .
The metaphysics o* physics declares that the ultimate o " ratter is the cen-
ter of force . fir. r'illiam Fansay is just out ^ith his theory o^ the possi-
bility of transmute ti on
,
the scientific affirmation’ that reality is ro wo-
men t t o the ver y cor e .
How
,
in view of the irresis title sweep the doctrine of action, ex-
plicit or implicit in every department of life, philosophy refuses to be
bound longer in the grave-clothes of lifeless system.?. Tie call for deliv-
erance from the helpless ~od of the Elea tics ard the Ira dieys finds its re-
sponse in the pragmatic school T"hose adherents maintain that there is one
certainty amidst a heap of mysteries, and that, is that motion is. some how
a fact. If materialistic philosophy as a system of thought precludes such
a thing as motion, then materialism is wrong, and must go. ~ive us idealism
then, for whatever is left must square itself with the principle that action
is not only a possibility but is a s j r e ciua r or 1 of T'.e true philosophy of
t ie universe.
YTen we come to the questions concerning the credibility and validity
pf those great ideas which may be said to be universal ” ri th the race, Tod
as a person and individual immortality, what has pragmatism to say? That
must it say? Let. us examine the answers 4 o these two great, questions, Is
there a personal Tod? and Is personal immortality a fact?
/s to the question, Is there a personal Tod? Professor Lames says:
"I myself believe that the evidence for Tod lies primarily in inner per-
sonal experience.” ("Pragmatism,” p. 109), v e know the tendency of the
times is to regard personal experience everywhere and the deeper impulses
r <
of our nature a? of real scientific worth. he appeal is to t he heart a
s
well as to the head. It 1° to the ^hole nan ?r 1 not simply to his intellect.
There are necessities or reason and there are necessities of s r i r i t
.
If we
say that a certain thing rust be so because it is the imperative demand of
lo-fi o . why shall - e not say that certain other things must be true because
they are Just as imperatively demanded by our r:.Q'v ~I r^ture? Trauma tism
comes to these great earnings of the heart and these esser t ial hypothses
of conduct, and proposes to build upon them a philoso] hy that rests upon
%
their substantial trustworthiness.
Pragmatism can Join hards with the interpretation o^ evolution as
made by John Fiske. His little book, "Through Fat-ure to hod," ou ,rT ill re-
call
,
is in substance this: That, since the heart of the doctrine of evolu-
tion is that the organism adjusts itself to its environment, and that the
response within is to a challenge without, an inward response is the guar-
antee of the outer challenging reality. Hot as the result of a trar scer.dcr. ta
system of philosophy, ’"hi ch is irtellectualism Tone rampart, but as the re-
sult of the pragmatic teaching that the natural order of thing? is not the
illusive prank the impersonal Absolute, does Hr. Fisk finally sum up
his conclusion in these words: "Q* r 11 the ii: plica ti ons of the doctrine of
evolution with regard to man, I believe the very deepest and strongest to
be that which asserts the Everlasting Feality of Feligion." (” Through na-
ture to hod," p. 191 ). And we know that the hod for which he contended ’"as
what he c»lls a "quasi-human hod," that, is, a personal being ,,rith whom we
m.sy commune.
As we have alrea,dy stated", the argumer t upon which Kant based his as-
surance o f a morsl r>r d personal hod, ,r,sp "the categorical imperative," ever-
t
lasting "ought," which underlies all personal responsibili ty and social
obligation. T.iis is not an appeal to the transcen dental order for proof,

but it is proof based upon the credibility «f the essential demand of our
moral nature. He could find no foundation p or this belief spire in the ex-
istence of a moral Being. Jr ot ier words , he maintained t let J. iis ougctn.essV
' rhi oh we cannot escape, has a positive value in the vs of actual proof which
cannot be found ir the realm; o** pure reason alone. The practical demand was,
as we know, a potent factor ir his thinking. How, this "practical reason,"
as he called it, was- ,,Thp t we might perfectly well re-name the "pragmatic rea-
son." It was an appeal to the indispensable demands of our natures which
while independent of logical deductions are none the less imperative. How,
thi r' moral demand was to him, as we psj.d
,
a practical and reliable proof of
the existence of a moral Being whom we call r- o d
,
As to the second question, which is answered affirmatively by pragmatism
rather than by tra.nsoen den talism, Is personal immortality a fact? I 'ill say
tha. t after all, our confidence in the belief that we shall continue to live
after we cease to manifest ourselves here is due ^ery largely, i^ not chief-
ly, to our general confidence in the sanity an 1 justice of the universe. If
there be not a future life, we say, then there can be no such thing as jus-
tice on the throne of the present order o r things. Perfect justice or ua jus-
tice at all. Ho*
•
perfect justice is certainly rot realized in this life. But
we feel confident that ure do see the workings of justice though only begun,
and we feel sure of justice because of the imperative of our moral nature.
Hence since there is_ ur loubtedly, we say, such a thing as pa?~t ia 1 justice .
complete justice will follow. That guarantees another life than this.
But there is another way to, approach the idea, of personal immortality
in order to *et a pragmatic proof of its- value, and that is to consider just
what the removal o r such a hope ""mild rear 4 o the race. Could we get along
without such a hope, such a belief? Let us hear ^ha t others say on this

1point.
Jo nr Stuart Kill pays: "The beneficial ef n ect of s' ch a hope is far
from trifling. It i®kes life an’ human nature a far greater thing c the
feelings
,
and gives greater strergth as well as solemn i ty to all the ser.-
timer ts Trdiich are awakened in us "by our fello" -cree tures , ai d by mankind at
large. I't allays that sense of the irony of Nature which i s so painfully
felt "hen we see the exertions and sacrifices of a life culminating in the
fori!}? ti on of a wise and noble mind, orly to disappear from the world when
the time has just arrived at which the ’"orld seers about to begin reaping
the benefit of it. The truth that life is short and art long, is from of old
one of the most discouraging parts o r our condition} this hope admits the
possibility that the art employed in improving and beautifying the soul it-
self may avail for good in some other life, even ’"her: seemingly useless for
this .
"
I do not recall a stronger statement of the in -dispensableress of the
idea itself than that of Err s t reran : Vrhe day in which the belief in an
after li re shall vn^ish rror the earth ’"ill wi tress a terrific moral and
spiritual decadence. Rome o r us might perhaps do —i thout it, provided only
that others held it fast, but there is no lever capable raising an entire
people i r once they have lost their faith in the immortality of the soul."
I think that it is beyond question that- the idea o -'’ a personal -od
and o f personal immortality is_ indispensable + o our b e s
t
living. The full-
est life, it seems ,to me and to most, can come only -ith these i leas r i rrr.ly
believed . Now the question, resolves itself into this: Is the deepest need
of our natures met only by fa.lseh.ood? If so, error is mightier and works
b e tte r tha n t he truth . Now p ra tiem bru she s aside t ra r s c er den t a 1 b efo g
-
g ery and scepticism and affirms that the facts of the universe a.re more
powerful than its fictions, and that the nearer our ideas lead us toward
($
J
the reality about which t hey predict
,
the "better t'e results
;
the more cor-
rect our ideas are, the better they work. It is confidence, I soy, in the
sanity or- the justice of the uri verse ; the belief that rs ore capable of
judging or. the whole and ir. the rain as to what sanity n r 1 justice demon d
,
and that what most certainly ou ™ht 4 o be root assuredly ' ill be.
Te must r linit that "now w© see as ir o mirror darkly,” but we see,
nevertheless, or dwe believe that our eye-sight ”111 improve with age un-
til by and by we shall see face to face. Confidence in the general trust-
worthiness of our faculties assures us that "there is o true light which
lighteth every man as he core th into the ,r*orld. " "If that light therefore
that is in us become dnrkress, then how great is that darkness." but un-
der the ministry of our better natures it will kindle in the breiast until
in its radiant glow we become confident of a portal on the other side of
the tomb also, whose threshhold is pressed only by those feet henceforth
immortal. By native instinct there is a sacred protest registered in the
very constitution of our being which cries out against injustice, and re-
fuses to submit to imperfect, and unfair decisions, though they come from
earth’s highest tribunals. "It is not on earth that heaven's justice ends,”
said the Old Schoolrna s ter above the lifeless body o^ Little Bell. .And my
own sense of right impels me to add that heaver has ro justice if there be
not some sphere other than this where an e suitable adjudication shall final-
ly be mp de o p all earth’s glaring disproportions; a place where those who
cave gone forth in the morning of vg^t reforms, bearing precious seed in
their bruised and aching hands, shall come home with rejoicing, bringing
their sheaves with them; where those who have borne the heat and the bur-
den of the day shall rest from their labors and receive a just recompense
for their unrequited toil; where those whose pure hearts have broken from
a sense o^ deadly and undeserved wrong shall see of the travail of their
tr.
souls
,
ard s ha 1 1 be satisfied; where the martyr to every worthy cause shall
be crowned by holier hands than ours; •"here all the twisted threads of life
mysterious we? wing shall be untangled; and where lore that has waited long,
and still ir kind, shall hare its own f orerer . This is the irrepressible
cry of tlie human heart ir every age and under erery sky. rhe pragmatic log-
ic is to credit that demand as pointing to the reali *y ”hich it postulates,
and to attach, after all, tremer lous philosophic al -'orth to the reasoning
of the poet
:
’’It must be so Plato, +hou reasonest well!
Else why this pleasing hope, this fond desire,
This longing hr immortality?
Or whence this secret dread, ard inward horror,
Of falling into nought? T’hy shrinks the soul
Back on herself ard star ties at destruction?
1 Tis the divinity that stirs within us;
'Tis header itself that points out the hereafter
And intimates eternity t^ man."
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